In today’s “Clock Ticking Against Assad,” another NYT analyst equates “studied abroad, elegant British-born wife, French speaking, and widely-read” with a desire “to reform the repressive police state he inherited from his father, given time and opportunity.” We are told that Bashar, unlike his stern father, “seems quiet, almost meek.”
The press’s treatment of Assad reminds me of the foolish optimism that greeted the appointment of the “sophisticated” Yury Andropov. (Andropov must be a reformer; he loves jazz, cognac and speaks foreign languages. Bashar must be a reformer he studied medicine in Britain).
Apparently Assad’s brutal crackdown of his own people has dashed our expectations. The Obama administration’s bet that Assad, the closet reformer, will democratize and broker a real peace with Israel appears to be lost. But, we learn from the article that this is not Basher’s fault. He is surrounded by sinister relatives and security forces, who stymie his benevolent impulses. His fault (according to an anonymous diplomat) is that he “doesn’t have the courage to do what he needs to do for the sake of the country.”
Somehow we are supposed to believe that one of the world’s tightest and most brutal dictatorships is made up of “good” and “bad” factions, where the bad guys do bad things behind the back of the “good” head of state. We are supposed to believe that Syrian security forces assassinated a leading Lebanese politician without Bashar knowing. Bashar must also be blissfully unaware of Syria’s support of Hezbollah mischief, or of the clandestine attempt to build nuclear weapons.
We are told that Basher’s salvation is meaningful reform. The Baath regime will survive if it allows freedom of assembly and press and opposition political parties! For Bashar’s sake, he should not read such stuff. Basher’s survival chances are near zero if he offers “meaningful reforms.” They will only show weakness and intensify the demonstrations (now without fear of being shot dead). The only “reform” the outraged Syrian population will accept is the removal of Bashar and his entire regime. Bashar Assad, like Qadaffi in Libya and the Mullahs in Iran, can only survive by the sword. That is their best chance, and they are likely to win.
Our diplomats and journalists must learn that dictatorships operate according to specific dynamics that do not depend on the education, background, or humanistic orientation of their leaders. Stalin was extremely well read; was kind to his daughter, and made a great impression on Roosevelt. Pol Pot frequented Paris coffee houses as he wrote his dissertation at the Sorbonne. aitler had excellent table manners. Bashar speaks French and reads good books.
These things make little difference. They are a foundation of sand upon which to base foreign policy.
Showing posts with label Qadaffi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Qadaffi. Show all posts
Monday, April 25, 2011
Sunday, April 3, 2011
Qadaffi’s Defection Math: A Different View
Qadaffi is an experienced despot; otherwise he would not have held office for forty years. He knows how to calculate the best ways to stay in power.
By my count, Qadaffi can be defeated in four ways: 1) His inner circle overthrows him (and most likely kills him). 2) He voluntarily leaves the country. 3) He is defeated by an opposition army supported by foreign forces. 4) He is killed by a targeted missile (or even a stray one). Option 2 is hard to gauge. We do not know whether Gadaffi is a coward or, more likely, a pragmatic survivor. My own guess is that he will decide his best chance for survival is to stay in Libya and win. Once he leaves, his fate will be determined by others. Options 3-4 are a matter of chance and are unpredictable. Foreign powers, it appears, will not join forces with Libyan rebels, and the Anti-Gadaffi alliance does not seem to have the stomach for assassination by missile.
If history is a guide, the most likely option is number 1: The dictator is killed by his inner circle. Despots, contrary to the Hollywood scenes of an angry mob storming the palace, are killed by their closest associates (Caesar: Et tu, Brute?). The one execution of a dictator as the Soviet empire collapsed was Nicola Ceausescu, whose inner circle lined him and his wife up before a wall and shot them.
Qadaffi’s most immediate concern therefore is to prevent a winning coalition from forming within his inner circle.
Political scientist Bruce Beuno de Mesquita proposes a simple and common sense formula for the conditions under which a coalition unseats an incumbent dictator: The dictator’s inner circle ultimately decides whether the dictator stays or goes. A winning anti-incumbent coalition must offer the inner circle an expected reward for betrayal that exceeds that of the status quo. The term “expected” shows why the incumbent dictator has a huge advantage. Potential conspirators have two unknowns: Will the coup be successful? If successful, will the new dictator deliver the promised reward? If either of these has a low probability, the incumbent dictator stays in office.
This brings us to defector math. Qadaffi is well aware that the main threat comes from his inner circle, but he does not know who his most likely enemies are. His inner circle knows that they are already in extreme danger. He must be evaluating each of them to asses the chances of betrayal. Those who occupy “power positions,” such as head of the secret police, militia, or military are most dangerous. They actually have the power to unseat him. Economic or diplomatic officials pose a lesser threat. A Qadaffi would rather err on the side of eliminating a loyal follower than sparing a rival. Family or clan members are in the least danger. Blood runs thicker than water.
The optimal course of action for the inner circle is for them to defect as soon as possible. But their defection actually serves the interest of the dictator. Defecting potential rivals remove themselves from the inner circle and can no longer organize or be a part of a coalition to unseat him. Another benefit is that the inner circle becomes a smaller tight-knit group of clear loyalists.
The Western press depicts defections as a sign that Qadaffi’s hold on power is weakening. According to defector math, however, defections strengthen the dictator. In a power struggle like this, it is not particularly relevant to Qadaffi whether Western governments think he is weakening or not. What matters most to him is what is going on inside his inner circle.
We have historical examples that show that defections do not weaken a dictator’s hold on power. Fidel Castro allowed massive defections to remove potential trouble makers from his island. Saddam Hussein’s regime suffered many defections, but none of them played a decisive role in unseating him. Belarus dictator Lukashenko has actively encouraged regime opponents to defect, and he remains in power.
Qadaffi’s likely reaction to each defector is: “Good by and good riddance. I’ll catch up with you later.”
By my count, Qadaffi can be defeated in four ways: 1) His inner circle overthrows him (and most likely kills him). 2) He voluntarily leaves the country. 3) He is defeated by an opposition army supported by foreign forces. 4) He is killed by a targeted missile (or even a stray one). Option 2 is hard to gauge. We do not know whether Gadaffi is a coward or, more likely, a pragmatic survivor. My own guess is that he will decide his best chance for survival is to stay in Libya and win. Once he leaves, his fate will be determined by others. Options 3-4 are a matter of chance and are unpredictable. Foreign powers, it appears, will not join forces with Libyan rebels, and the Anti-Gadaffi alliance does not seem to have the stomach for assassination by missile.
If history is a guide, the most likely option is number 1: The dictator is killed by his inner circle. Despots, contrary to the Hollywood scenes of an angry mob storming the palace, are killed by their closest associates (Caesar: Et tu, Brute?). The one execution of a dictator as the Soviet empire collapsed was Nicola Ceausescu, whose inner circle lined him and his wife up before a wall and shot them.
Qadaffi’s most immediate concern therefore is to prevent a winning coalition from forming within his inner circle.
Political scientist Bruce Beuno de Mesquita proposes a simple and common sense formula for the conditions under which a coalition unseats an incumbent dictator: The dictator’s inner circle ultimately decides whether the dictator stays or goes. A winning anti-incumbent coalition must offer the inner circle an expected reward for betrayal that exceeds that of the status quo. The term “expected” shows why the incumbent dictator has a huge advantage. Potential conspirators have two unknowns: Will the coup be successful? If successful, will the new dictator deliver the promised reward? If either of these has a low probability, the incumbent dictator stays in office.
This brings us to defector math. Qadaffi is well aware that the main threat comes from his inner circle, but he does not know who his most likely enemies are. His inner circle knows that they are already in extreme danger. He must be evaluating each of them to asses the chances of betrayal. Those who occupy “power positions,” such as head of the secret police, militia, or military are most dangerous. They actually have the power to unseat him. Economic or diplomatic officials pose a lesser threat. A Qadaffi would rather err on the side of eliminating a loyal follower than sparing a rival. Family or clan members are in the least danger. Blood runs thicker than water.
The optimal course of action for the inner circle is for them to defect as soon as possible. But their defection actually serves the interest of the dictator. Defecting potential rivals remove themselves from the inner circle and can no longer organize or be a part of a coalition to unseat him. Another benefit is that the inner circle becomes a smaller tight-knit group of clear loyalists.
The Western press depicts defections as a sign that Qadaffi’s hold on power is weakening. According to defector math, however, defections strengthen the dictator. In a power struggle like this, it is not particularly relevant to Qadaffi whether Western governments think he is weakening or not. What matters most to him is what is going on inside his inner circle.
We have historical examples that show that defections do not weaken a dictator’s hold on power. Fidel Castro allowed massive defections to remove potential trouble makers from his island. Saddam Hussein’s regime suffered many defections, but none of them played a decisive role in unseating him. Belarus dictator Lukashenko has actively encouraged regime opponents to defect, and he remains in power.
Qadaffi’s likely reaction to each defector is: “Good by and good riddance. I’ll catch up with you later.”
Monday, March 21, 2011
“Kill Qadaffi” (Plus Other Thoughts)
Despite protestations that we are not after regime change, the allied bombing makes no sense unless this is our goal. Our stated objective is to reduce civilian casualties, but if Qadaffi remains in power, the loss of civilian lives will be huge as he wreaks his revenge on anyone he suspects of disloyalty or even wavering. Civilian losses near the battlefield will be trivial compared to a surviving Qadaffi’s political repressions. We can only protect civilian lives by getting rid of him. I suspect everyone understands this but cannot speak the words “Kill Qadaffi!”.
A second thought: I wonder how the American public’s stomach will hold up when Qadaffi starts displaying civilian casualties. If there are none, he can always create some. The media’s sympathies are against Qadaffi, but they will not be able to ignore the story when he piles up the bodies and women and children. These grisly displays will run counter to the French, British and U.S. militaries’ descriptions of antiseptic surgical strikes. The outrage of antiwar groups in the U.S. and Europe, who do not like cost-benefit analysis of casualties, will rise to the boiling point.
I must confess that I am puzzled by China’s and Russia’s abstentions at the U.N. Security Council. Their votes might be less puzzling if Qadaffi were clearly on his way out, but the outcome is up for grabs. Russia is remarkably consistent; Putin gains from stirring the pot of unrest. Uncertainty raises oil prices, which he desperately needs to repair his state finances. Russia likes to side against the U.S. in just about any and all matters. China’s abstention is even more puzzling. China is consistent in opposing any outside intervention to strike at political oppression. They understand that attention could turn to them at some point.
If Qadaffi survives the first week of bombardments and turns this into a protracted civil war, he can win. Russia and China will raise their level of criticism. Anti-war sentiment will rise as civilian casualties mount. Qadaffi can move beyond the immediate emergency to the slaughter of opponents in areas he controls.
A second thought: I wonder how the American public’s stomach will hold up when Qadaffi starts displaying civilian casualties. If there are none, he can always create some. The media’s sympathies are against Qadaffi, but they will not be able to ignore the story when he piles up the bodies and women and children. These grisly displays will run counter to the French, British and U.S. militaries’ descriptions of antiseptic surgical strikes. The outrage of antiwar groups in the U.S. and Europe, who do not like cost-benefit analysis of casualties, will rise to the boiling point.
I must confess that I am puzzled by China’s and Russia’s abstentions at the U.N. Security Council. Their votes might be less puzzling if Qadaffi were clearly on his way out, but the outcome is up for grabs. Russia is remarkably consistent; Putin gains from stirring the pot of unrest. Uncertainty raises oil prices, which he desperately needs to repair his state finances. Russia likes to side against the U.S. in just about any and all matters. China’s abstention is even more puzzling. China is consistent in opposing any outside intervention to strike at political oppression. They understand that attention could turn to them at some point.
If Qadaffi survives the first week of bombardments and turns this into a protracted civil war, he can win. Russia and China will raise their level of criticism. Anti-war sentiment will rise as civilian casualties mount. Qadaffi can move beyond the immediate emergency to the slaughter of opponents in areas he controls.
Friday, March 18, 2011
Qadaffi’s “Cease Fire:” What Would Stalin Do?
Republicans sometimes ask: “What would Reagan do? Christians ask: “What would Christ have done in this situation.” Dictators like Qadaffi, Saddam Hussein, and Kim Il Sung could ask the same question of their patron saint: Josif Stalin. Stalin wrote the playbook for dictators – how to grab and hold onto power. In actuality, unconstrained dictators, of the Stalin type like Qadaffi, do not need his advice. They became brutal dictators by being the best specialists in political terror. They intuitively understand what Stalin would have advised.
Qadaffi’s “victory within 48 hours” appears to have been snatched away at the last minute by the remarkable U.N resolution to establish a no fly zone and apply necessary force to save civilians. Qadaffi’s road to survival has unexpectedly become rockier. What would we expect the Qadaffi/Stalin dictator to do next?
First, like Stalin, Qadaffi would be most frightened of the threat of external force. Stalin signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact at great cost to head off Hitler’s troops. Qadaffi, likewise, will do anything necessary to head off any foreign intervention. He will promise to abide by a cease fire. He will assure the outside world that he values civilian life, and will do everything necessary to protect his people “who love him” He will continue to hold territory his loyalists occupy and will probe only at the margins – never giving outside forces a reason to act.
Second, like Stalin, Qadaffi understands that the external threat will hearten his domestic enemies, which he now understands are everywhere. Any increase in the external threat must be countered by extreme political repression in territories he holds, especially Tripoli. Like Stalin, he understands that the ensuing bloodbath must be kept as quiet as possible. Western journalists must be kept away at any cost, even if it means killing them. Arrests will take place at night. Neighbors know that if they say anything, they are next.
Third, like Stalin, Qadaffi will upgrade his propaganda efforts, what Stalin called "mobilization." In this case, he lacks Stalin’s advantages of gullible Western intellectuals and journalists who sympathize with his cause of “building socialism.” Qadaffi, who has few remaining friends, will be hard pressed to find his NYT’s Walter Duranty or Guardian reporters to deny the Ukrainian famine or vouch for the veracity of his Moscow Show Trials. Qadaffi does have cash; maybe he can find some mouthpieces who can make his case credibly and make a difference.
Fourth, like Stalin, Qadaffi will shorten the leash on his state security apparatus. His state security officers will receive outrageous benefits and will be given to understand the price of disloyalty. The control of state and security will devolve to his immediate family and most trusted loyalists.
Will Qadaffi survive by employing these tactics? Unless the Western powers are willing to bomb Qadaffi troops that are, by all intents and purposes scrupulously observing a case fire, he has a good chance.
Qadaffi’s “victory within 48 hours” appears to have been snatched away at the last minute by the remarkable U.N resolution to establish a no fly zone and apply necessary force to save civilians. Qadaffi’s road to survival has unexpectedly become rockier. What would we expect the Qadaffi/Stalin dictator to do next?
First, like Stalin, Qadaffi would be most frightened of the threat of external force. Stalin signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact at great cost to head off Hitler’s troops. Qadaffi, likewise, will do anything necessary to head off any foreign intervention. He will promise to abide by a cease fire. He will assure the outside world that he values civilian life, and will do everything necessary to protect his people “who love him” He will continue to hold territory his loyalists occupy and will probe only at the margins – never giving outside forces a reason to act.
Second, like Stalin, Qadaffi understands that the external threat will hearten his domestic enemies, which he now understands are everywhere. Any increase in the external threat must be countered by extreme political repression in territories he holds, especially Tripoli. Like Stalin, he understands that the ensuing bloodbath must be kept as quiet as possible. Western journalists must be kept away at any cost, even if it means killing them. Arrests will take place at night. Neighbors know that if they say anything, they are next.
Third, like Stalin, Qadaffi will upgrade his propaganda efforts, what Stalin called "mobilization." In this case, he lacks Stalin’s advantages of gullible Western intellectuals and journalists who sympathize with his cause of “building socialism.” Qadaffi, who has few remaining friends, will be hard pressed to find his NYT’s Walter Duranty or Guardian reporters to deny the Ukrainian famine or vouch for the veracity of his Moscow Show Trials. Qadaffi does have cash; maybe he can find some mouthpieces who can make his case credibly and make a difference.
Fourth, like Stalin, Qadaffi will shorten the leash on his state security apparatus. His state security officers will receive outrageous benefits and will be given to understand the price of disloyalty. The control of state and security will devolve to his immediate family and most trusted loyalists.
Will Qadaffi survive by employing these tactics? Unless the Western powers are willing to bomb Qadaffi troops that are, by all intents and purposes scrupulously observing a case fire, he has a good chance.
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