How Russia is Ruled: Inights from the BP Failure

The failure of BP’s venture with Rosneft provides tantalizing hints about how Russia is governed and its 2012 Election. BP joins with Shell, Exxon, and other major international energy companies in chalking up yet another failure in Russia’s lawless investment climate. BP should have known better after losing management control of its TNK-BP venture to its Russian AAR partners. But this time, BP felt it had the right people on its side.

When BP signed with the Russian state oil company, Rosneft, to develop offshore arctic reserves, I expected this would prove to be yet another misadventure. But BP thought this deal would be different. It was negotiated with Putin’s right-hand man (Igor Sechin) and blessed by Putin himself at the signing ceremony. There was the small matter of an exclusivity agreement with BP’s billionaire-Russian partners in its TNK-BP venture, but BP thought that matter would be “taken care of” by the Russian side (a la Khodorkovsky?). Surely the Russian state would back a deal that could rejuvenate Russia’s lagging energy production and fill state coffers.

The oligarchs behind AAR -- Mikhail Fridman of Alfa Group, Len Blavatnik of Access Industries, and  Viktor Vekselberg of  Renova--  proved too formidable for BP. They also brought to the table an unusual weapon for Russian companies – a legal position that carried weight in international courts.  

Putin did not take care of the Russian side. The AAR partners took BP to court outside of Russia and won an injunction that quashed the whole deal. Fridman, Veksleberg, and Blavatnik did offer BP a “deal” early on  -- that they take half of BP’s half in the arctic venture with Rosneft.  BP first boycotted the meeting called to vote on this proposal and then vetoed it outright.

My first take was that “the Russian side” had set BP up from the very beginning. AAR, Sechin and Putin had agreed to squeeze BP’s share of the deal down to a quarter, leaving one half for Rosneft and  one quarter for the three billionaires. Maybe one quarter would be enough for a BP teetering in its recovery from its Gulf  oil spill disaster.

I was wrong. It appears there is no “Russian side.” The deal is dead. Sechin is mad  at the three billionaires and is threatening them. Rosneft has to find another partner, but what major oil company would get involved in such a mess now? BP is not out of the woods. Rosneft could sue it for damages resulting from the failed deal. This is clearly a deal gone bad for all parties. There are no winners – only losers.

BP’s saga gives us insights into how Putin’s Russia is run. Instead of  well-defined hierarchical relationships, the Russian system of governance is  comprised of swirling forces, competing against each other. Equilibrium is never reached. There are never any final victories over competitors. According to this interpretation, Russia is far from a “KGB state” of former KGB officials and allied oligarchs, who obey the “Master” Putin. Putin is the most important player, but one of many.

BP’s Travails Continue: Is Something Big Going On In Russia? (The NYT and BP Still Do Not Get It?)

The NYT’s “Misreading the Enigma” gets one thing right: BP has lacked “geopolitical acumen” in its Russian dealings. BP’s proposed share swap with Rossneft (the State oil giant) is on permanent hold. The Stockholm arbitration court says BP may have violated its shareholder agreement with its billionaire AAR partners in their private BP-TNK Russian oil venture.

It now turns out (according to confidential NYT sources within BP) that BP had disclosed the potential conflict to the Kremlin but thought that the Kremlin “would resolve any difficulties with the local shareholders” because the BP deal coincided with the Russian national interest. BP failed to understand that in the Russian KGB state, no one (including Putin) really cares about the “national interest.” The confidential BP source went on to state the obvious: “It hasn’t happened yet. It has to happen now.”

It also turns out that the presumed patron of the deal, Putin, was aware of the conflict and remarked at the signing that the AAR partners were “litigious.” Putin now claims he was “completely in the dark.” BP “didn’t say a word about this.”

Here is the proper interpretation of what is going on: When BP struck its deal in January, the Russian treasury was empty. It needed investment in arctic oil, and the world price of oil was low. Russia needed BP. BP, thinking Putting was on their side, assumed that Putin would “pull a Khodorkovsky” on the AAR billionaires. If they want to kick up a fuss against the deal, Putin had a steel cage ready for them in a Moscow courtroom, BP thought.

Putin did not put the squeeze on the AAR billionaires for any of a number of reasons: First, AAR had already bought him off to help them in their plan to get half of BP’s half of the Rossneft deal. (Putin might need a few billion more for his portfolio). Second, Putin can take on a single Oligarch (such as Khodorkovsky), but can’t take on three at once. If this is the reason, Putin is less powerful than we think. Third, Putin fears he faces a real challenge from Medvedev in the 2012 presidential election and needs the AAR billionaires and their media empires on his side.

Whatever the interpretation, things do not look good for BP, which is now looking for a “reasonable commercial solution.” That solution is the one I have been predicting for quite a while: AAR gets one quarter of the Rossneft drilling venture, “Russia” get a half, and BP is reduced from a half to a quarter.

Such is the price of misreading the geopolitical tea leaves.