Ukraine,
the holder of the third largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, agreed to give
them up in signing the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. In return for
de-nuclearizing, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia assured
Ukraine’s territorial integrity. When Russia annexed Crimea contrary to
international law and Russia backed an invasion of Eastern Ukraine, neither the
United States nor the United Kingdom fulfilled its obligations under the
Budapest Memorandum to protect Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In its hostile
actions against Ukraine, Russia broke the foundation of postwar peace; namely,
the sanctity of existing national boundaries.
I
find it strange that, in the discussion of the de-nuclearization of North
Korea, reference is made mainly to Libya’s Gadhafi giving up his nuclear
program, as an example of the untrustworthiness of major-power guarantees. Gadhafi
voluntarily allowed in inspectors who oversaw the dismantling of the Libyan weapons
program, but he received no guarantees of personal safety or territorial
integrity from the major powers.
The Ukraine
case, on the other hand, constituted a clear abrogation of treaty obligations
on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom, and, of course,
Russia. If General Secretary Kim of North Korea has doubts about entering an
agreement with the United States that would leave him without nuclear weapons,
he should ponder the case of Ukraine.
A nuclear Ukraine would likely still be
in possession of Crimea and not have Russian troops and equipment in its East.
