Alleged whistleblower Russian FSB officers declare that the war is lost, mobilization is not possible, Putin isolated (a chaotic decisionmaker), can't even count the dead, the nuclear button a bluff, how to win still if Zelenskiy signs a "soft" peace agreement.
Reason for the letters: to avoid the purges which have already begun.
Retired Russian Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, the head of the All-Russian Officers Assembly, has gone public with a statement that calls for Russian President Vladimir Putin to resign over the confrontation involving Ukraine. To remove any doubt as to his message, Ivashov, 78, followed the public statement with an interview on a liberal Russian media outlet, Echo Moskvy, insisting that he was speaking in the name of the assembly of retired and reservist Russian officers which he heads.
In any peace negotiation, such as those in Minsk in 2014 and 2015, Russia insists it belongs on the side of the peacemakers and that by no means is Russia a combatant. In fact, according to this logic, Russian troops should be used to maintain the peace. In fact, Ukrainian analysts fear that Russia will cite “humanitarian concerns” to justify the permanent occupation of eastern Ukraine.
And Blinken enters the negotiation bereft of the biggest weapon of all — the threatened use of U.S. or NATO troops. That option is already off the table. Blinken can either wait to be caught off-kilter by the next blow from Putin or to set up truly crushing sanctions to be applied in the case Russia violates a red line (which we appear not to have established). Among these sanctions would clearly be the end of Russia's Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline project, personal sanctions on Putin’s inner circle, removal of Russia from the Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), or the sanctioning of Russia’s central bank — the ultimate weapon.
Russian troops serving as “peacekeepers” in Kazakhstan can open up a new relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan. Not only will Russian troops be a presence in Kazakhstan — as in Belarus, Russian cadres will find their way into Kazakhstan’s media, business, and public affairs.
Now the bombshell: In her Sunday appearances on national TV, Baerbock declared that Nord Stream 2 could not become operational because, according to coalition agreements, the undersea pipeline was not consistent with European energy law. Hence, per Baerbock, Nord Stream 2 cannot be approved because it does not meet the decoupling, transparency, and capacity-sharing required by the EU’s Gas Directive. Who would have thought that the Social Democrats and Greens would be Ukraine’s savior?
The December 7 virtual summit between President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin proved (as expected) an uneven match. According to the short White House readout, Biden threatened Russia with “strong economic and other measures” in the event of military escalation and reiterated his support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. (There was no mention of sanctions for Russia’s use of soft power to overthrow the democratically elected government of Ukraine). In contrast, the virtual summit format gave Putin free reign to mount an uninterrupted 700-word full-throated attack on the West. Putin’s “frank” indictment of Ukraine, NATO, and the US was meant for his domestic audience and for those many in the West ambivalent towards Ukraine. At no time in the two-hour discussion did Biden attempt to rebut any of Putin’s charges, no matter how outrageous. With the attention of the world focused on the Russian build up on the Ukrainian border, Biden passed on the opportunity to present a clear account of his side of the case. Perhaps Biden is unclear as to what his “side” really is.
The two sides
disagreed even on why the virtual summit was called. Per Biden, the summit was
called to address the Russian threat to Ukraine. Putin claimed the main topics
were the “the internal Ukrainian crisis and the lack of progress in the
implementation of the Minsk agreements… which are the uncontested basis for a
peaceful settlement.” Putin proceeded to complain about “the destructive line
of Kiev, aimed at completely dismantling the Minsk agreements.” He also
condemned “Kiev's provocative actions against Donbass." So Ukraine is the
real threat not the 100,000 troops poised on Ukraine’s border. It would not be
hard for Biden to have rebutted this claim.
So we learn from
Putin’s summit monologue that the true aggressors are NATO and the United
States. Ukraine is merely a puppet, but a dangerous one that has no claim to
legitimacy. Given the alleged imminent threat facing Russia, Putin contends
that the West should offer guarantees that would rule out NATO expansion to the
east. (I guess the Swedish and Dutch armies should stand down with no invasion
of Russia in the works.)
The Russian press
release briefly mentions Biden’s "allegedly" threatening "nature
of the movements of Russian troops near the Ukrainian borders and outlined
sanctions measures that the United States and its allies would be ready to
apply in case of further escalation of the situation.” Putin’s response is that
NATO is the threat in its “dangerous attempts to conquer Ukrainian territory and
building up its military potential at our borders.”
The Russian
Interfax release characterized the conversation as “frank and
businesslike" Both presidents agreed to instruct their representatives to
enter into substantive consultations on these sensitive issues. Good luck.
After the summit’s
conclusion, Biden sent out spokespersons to clarify that he meant business. The
new sanctions could include the newly-completed Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The
Kremlin meanwhile took advantage of Biden’s ambiguity by claiming
that both presidents agreed to negotiate the status of Ukraine and that NATO's growing ties with Ukraine and the possibility of
the alliance deploying missiles targeted against Russia there represent a
"red line" that cannot be crossed.
The key takeaways
from the December 7 summit are: First, we must recognize that the two sides are
separated by a Grand-Canyon-like chasm. Second, the differences are too great
for a political solution, unless the West decides to capitulate. Third, even in
the case of capitulation, the Russian side cannot be counted on to live up to
its side of the agreement. (If it is
agreed that Ukraine must remain neutral, Russia will proceed to destroy all
politically neutral forces in Ukraine). Fourth, we cannot afford to have
summits that allow Putin free reign to tell his version of truth unrebutted. We
now see that Biden is clearly not up to the task. Let’s hope he gives up on the
idea of personal diplomacy.
When Biden zooms with Putin on Tuesday, he will see that Putin holds all the cards — and he only a pair of deuces, in the form of sending enough lethal military equipment to Ukraine to raise the cost to Putin of a military invasion.
In July, President Joe Biden and German Chancellor Angela Merkel agreed to reimpose sanctions if Vladimir Putin used gas as a “geopolitical weapon.” This agreement constituted a concession in return for Biden’s waiver of sanctions on Nord Stream 2, which allowed its completion. Merkel had already vouched for continued gas deliveries through Ukraine — a questionable pledge from a politician leaving office.
Despite these Biden-Merkel assurances, Putin’s Kremlin has engaged in undisguised blackmail to render Europe hostage to Russia’s gas monopoly, Gazprom. Putin’s blackmail aims to force the speedy certification of Gazprom’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline by delivering less gas to Europe. Putin’s ultimate goal: Destroy the European Union’s competitive and transparent energy market.
In the United States’ perennial quest for allies who share goals and contribute their fair share toward security, Ukraine is an exceptional bargain. This was perhaps the most important message that President Volodymir Zelenskiy carried with him to Washington last week in his face-to-face meeting with President Biden. Time will tell whether his message sinks in.
The United States has not had the best of experiences with choosing allies over the years. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Washington often has thrown in its lot with unsavory partners. In recent weeks, as Afghan forces collapsed despite the billions of dollars spent to train and equip them, it again became clear that lavish military aid buys neither friendly, stable governments nor territorial integrity. And within NATO, partner nations seem to want the American security blanket without always paying their dues or developing serious military forces of their own.
Zelenskiy, therefore, should have earned a warm reception from the Biden administration at the long-awaited Washington summit. Instead, he was received as a supplicant from a country characterized as paralyzed by corruption. The forty-three-year-old former TV actor, in his third year of office and first Washington visit, had come to America to counter Ukraine’s more-than-half-empty image in Washington.
Former Putin advisor Andrei Illarionov points out the enormous political leverage that Nord Stream 2 will bestow on Russia’s Gazprom: Come winter, there can be service interruptions that threaten customers that oppose Russian policies; others may be favored in terms of price and delivery if they bend to Putin’s rule. Russia can continue to squeeze Ukrainian territory, while its European gas customers keep quiet.
It is notable that the Biden decision comes at the right political moment for Nord Stream 2. With a national election scheduled for September, Merkel retiring and scandals threatening the traditional German ruling coalition, the resurgent German Green Party seems scheduled for significant gains. Perhaps there will even be a Green chancellor, or a Green foreign or economics minister. In such a case, the official policy of Germany would turn against Nord Stream 2.
Western powers often characterize Russia as a rogue state with nuclear weapons and a military disproportionate to its frail economy. Russia is the largest supplier of raw materials to the world economy. Its president, Vladimir Putin, does not let a trouble-making opportunity go to waste.
The new Biden administration has the responsibility of dealing with Russia that has forcibly changed Europe’s boundaries (Crimea), initiated a “separatist” war in East Ukraine, quasi-annexed parts of Georgia, shot down a passenger plane (MH17), intervened in Syria on behalf of Bashar Assad, interfered with foreign elections, assassinated regime opponents at home and abroad, kidnapped sailors in international waters and denied freedom of navigation on the Black and Azov Seas.
But Ukraine remains at the heart of Washington’s Putin Problem.
After Ukraine unseated its pro-Russian president in 2014 to pursue a policy of integration into the West, Putin has sought to unravel a democratic Ukraine through his proxy war in “separatist” Donetsk (DNR) and Luhansk (LNR) “peoples’ republics,” both governed by Moscow viceroys. The Kremlin’s propaganda campaign claims that Ukraine never has and never will be a nation, that it is run by crooks, neo-Nazis, and extremists who victimize Russian speakers.
In a word, the Kremlin hopes to convince the West that Ukraine is not worthy of support. Putin is now directing this message at President Joe Biden and his inner circle, perhaps with some success.
The West has had almost a decade to learn how to deal with Russia. Its preferred instrument has been sanctions to punish Russia for specific criminal acts, such as the shooting down of MH17 in July of 2014 or the poisoning and imprisonment on sham charges of Putin opponent Aleksei Navalny. The Trump administration, joined by the European Union, also levied stiff sanctions on companies associated with the new undersea pipeline (Nord Stream 2) from Russia to Germany. Nord Stream 2 would replace the Ukrainian pipeline network that has transported Russian gas to Europe through Central Europe for decades.
The West imposes sanctions on Russia as an incentive to improve behavior. If Russia were to, for example, admit guilt for shooting down MH17 and compensate relatives or release Navalny, the associated sanctions would be lifted.
So far, this strategy has not worked.
The Western world had every reason to expect that the new Biden administration would impose tough new sanctions on Nord Stream 2. After all, Biden publicly declared Nord Stream 2 “a bad deal for Europe” after declaring that Putin is a “killer.” Moreover, Biden let it be known that new sanctions for the Navalny affair were in the works.
To nearly everyone’s surprise the Biden administration announced on May 19 that it was waiving Nord Stream 2 sanctions, despite the fact that a strong bipartisan Senate majority supports new sanctions.
Biden’s stated rationale for clearing the way for the completion of Nord Stream 2: Trump, as President, damaged Washington-Berlin relations by criticizing Germany harshly for not meeting its commitments to NATO. Hence, the US should repair relations with their most important ally by supporting Angela Merkel through the Nord Stream 2 deal before she leaves office in September. Already gas production in European Union is declining, with Germany alone expected to increase consumption of natural gas by 20 Bcm by 2034 to 110 Bcm. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline under the Baltic would effectively bring more supply from reserves in Russia to Germany as well as to other countries in the EU. German officials project the pipeline o lower gas prices by 13% and allow Germany to decommission all nuclear power plants and coal plants by 2038 – as called for by Germany’s Energiewende.
By contrast, much of the EU, despite the opportunity to reap economic and environmental benefits of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline fear it as an instrument of Russian domination. As well, following Merkel’s departure in September, elections may usher in a change in Germany’s position on Nord Stream 2.
Without a doubt the big winner from Biden’s decision is Moscow. The big loser is Ukraine and the Kyiv-Washington relationship.
Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation regrets the loss of western credibility in Ukraine, and a perceived “downgrading of Ukraine on the scale of Western policy priorities” taken in deference to Russia, in particular the exemption of Nord Stream 2.
Ukraine understands that timing was not a coincidence. The waiver announcement was made on the day of the Blinken-Lavrov meeting to prepare for the Biden-Putin summit scheduled for June 19 in Geneva. Nord Steam 2, Ukraine believes, is Biden’s gift to Putin to entice him to the Geneva summit.
Ukraine reacted in a burst of diplomatic fury to what it perceived as the Biden betrayal. Washington did not even extend the courtesy of advance notice of the upcoming Nord Stream 2 waiver. Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskiy characterized the lifting of sanctions on Nord Stream 2 as a “defeat of the United States, a personal defeat of President Biden in terms of standing up to Russia […] a major Russian geopolitical victory, and a redistribution of power and influence [in Europe].” Zelenskiy went on to declare to be “personally worried about possible tradeoffs” at the Biden-Putin summit adversely affecting Ukraine.
The former Ukrainian foreign minister, Pavlo Klimkin, declaring that the US decision came as “a blow to the gut” to Ukraine and that “any signs of a crisis of confidence between Ukraine and the United States would be the worst thing that could happen at this time.”
The backlash to President Biden’s Nord Stream 2 decision required the White House Press Secretary, Jen Psaki, to declare that Washington "doesn't regard the meeting with the Russian President as a reward; we regard it as a vital part of defending America's interests." That the White House had to deny on record that Nord Stream 2 was a “bribe” to lure Putin to a summit is telling commentary.
Moreover, two fellows of the influential Council on Foreign Relations published in The Hill a “Green” apologia for Biden’s actions on May 20. The story, entitled “How to Turn Nord Stream 2 Into a Win for Ukraine,” contends that Ukraine’s loss of the gas transit business is a blessing in disguise. It frees the Ukrainian budget from reliance on carbon energy, and it allows Ukraine to focus on green energy. After all, in the long run, the world will be carbon free, so Ukraine can be at the forefront of the green energy revolution. As to Europe, the authors contend that Nord Stream 2 just replaces the capacity of the Ukrainian pipeline system. Overall gas volumes will be unaffected, so the gas price will be unaffected. Not to worry, Nord Stream 2 will have to obey German competition rules.
However, control of gas pipelines bestows considerable power over price and quantity. Given the substantial clout of the Russian lobby and its cyber warfare capacity to take out rivals, the Gazprom supplied Nord Stream 2 will not be a paragon of the competitive model.
The rules of the game have been that the US and EU were on Ukraine’s side and would do what is possible for Ukraine. Germany’s interests appear to supersede Ukraine’s, and incidentally favor Russia at the expense of Ukraine. But the Biden administration’s actions with respect to Nord Stream 2 and its rush into a one-on-one summit with Putin raise the question of whether this basic understanding has been broken – namely that the Biden administration does not regard Ukraine’s entry into the Western world as vital to the West’s interests.
Russia’s state gas company, Gazprom, makes no bones that it is an instrument of Russian foreign policy and power, not a commercial undertaking. What goes unmentioned is that, given the importance of gas revenue to Putin’s Russia. Russia cannot invade Ukraine so long as a considerable portion of its gas pipeline traverses through Ukraine. With Nord Stream 2 in full operation, Putin can invade at his convenience and a natural gas dependent Europe will do nothing except keep on buying Russian gas. If this is the cost of a greener energy mix, is the West willing to pay it?
Western media is greeting the Biden administration’s Russian sanctions as “signaling a tougher stance on Russia than under former President Donald Trump.” Vladimir Putin likely thinks otherwise.
It looks as if the Biden administration has blinked on Putin’s key foreign policy objective — the completion and operation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, delivering Russian gas to Europe. The sanctioning of a few Kremlin officials is petty change compared to the decade-long profitable effects of Russian pipeline politics.
The Navalny poisoning should remove any last doubts about the Kremlin’s routine use of political murder as an instrument of state policy. Navalny was scheduled to follow Boris Nemtsov, Anna Politkovskaya, Alexander Litvinenko, and many others to their early graves. Prior to Navalny, Putin and his Kremlin allies could always blame sinister false flag operations, lone mavericks, or ethnic gangs for these murders. With an exposed assassination squad, aided by military weapons labs and transportation coordinated by transport police, it would strain credulity to argue that the Navalny poisoning was not an operation of the Kremlin itself.
A conversation in Moscow:
Where do you work?
In the FSB.
What department?
The Department of Underwear.
They say that every morning before Putin puts on fresh underpants, he gives them to his guards to wear first.
Switching out jars of urine, washing other people's panties. The FSB still has many “wet” cases ahead. The whole world should tremble and fear!
In a word, the transfer of “the Putin system” to a successor should be a piece of cake. Immunity is another matter. Putin, as an “ex-KGB” surrounded by ex-KGB, seems bound to trust his immunity to security officials. Thus, Russia may end up with a “new Putin” from the already powerful security apparatus. The outlines of any transition will be defined by the Yeltsin precedent. We can anticipate an internecine battle royale among various interest groups of Putin’s inner circle; who comes out on top is anyone’s guess.
F.A. Hayek, in his 1944 “Road to Serfdom,” wrote that in political systems like Putin’s Russia, the worst rise to the top — namely, those most ruthless in using power. Thus, we might have to get used to a new Russian president who is worse than Putin.
The last thing Vladimir Putin needed is another hotspot in Russia’s “near abroad” — Russia’s term for the 14 republics that once were part of the old Soviet Union, along with the Russian Republic.
In 1994, Putin boasted of an ambitious imperial restoration project; his plans included a “New Russia” encompassing parts of Ukraine and Belarus, along with a Eurasian Union (including, among others, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) that eventually would grow to rival the European Union.
That was then. Now, Putin sees his vision fading as popular unrest and armed conflicts take hold in the former-USSR territories he had scheduled for restoration.
The smart money would be on NS2’s eventual completion and Russia’s continued domination of the European gas market. Navalny has survived, NS2’s defenders and lobbyists are in full swing. The Trump administration may have run out of sanctions options. The European Union has bigger problems to deal with. With the feeble demand for gas associated with COVID-19, Germany and Europe can take their time as Russia pulls out all stops in its defense of NS2.
NS2 will be completed. The only question is the duration of the delay.
The Kremlin has already made clear there will be no “transparent” investigation of the attempted murder of Aleksei Navalny. How can there be when the chief suspect is the head of state?
The West is not able to deal with a rogue state located in its heartland. Russian forces still occupy Crimea, Eastern Ukraine and Georgian territory; Russia still denies being involved in shooting down Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 over Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Russia ranks among the most dangerous countries for journalists, and any number of political assassinations remain unresolved.
When Putin is caught red handed, he keeps on playing for time and throws preposterous theories against the wall to see if any stick.
It seems that only the Russian people – somehow, some day – can find a solution.
Irrespective of Navalny’s health outcome, we can pretty well predict what will happen next: The Kremlin will cook up all kinds of alternative explanations for Navalny’s presumed poisoning. Almost certain will be charges that Navalny poisoned himself to get back at Putin, that the CIA slipped him the poison, or that it was those dastardly Ukrainians who did so. If necessary, Putin can raise the volume to blast the entire Russian Federation with the good news that their president (for life) is not to blame.
Perhaps the tried-and-true Putin playbook will not work this time; Russia already is sufficiently riled up — and Navalny is a sympathetic figure with a beautiful wife and daughters. Maybe Putin can no longer go to this well. But does he have other tricks up his sleeve? The smart money would bet that he does.
