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The
most direct measure of the economic cost of a pandemic is lost economic
activity. The most common aggregate measure of such costs would be the decline
in real GDP or industrial production (relative to trend) that is attributable
to the pandemic. Researchers have used municipal and regional data as an
alternative to try to tease out the loss of economic activity due to the
Spanish Flu but with contradictory results.
My results are summarized in Figures 1-3.
Figure 1 shows that
none of the four series suggests a detectable effect of the Spanish Flu on
economic activity-- not that there weren’t significant downturns during this
period of history, such as in 1914 and 1921.
In their classic study of the US business cycle,
Arthur Burns and W.C. Mitchell make no mention of the Spanish Flu (that I could
find). They characterize 1918-19 as a mild downturn that was speedily reversed.
America’s entry into World War 1 could confound the
above finding of an insignificant economic effect of the Spanish Flu. In 1917, 719,000 men were in the armed
forces. Within a year, that figure rose to almost three million. During the
call up, the unemployment rate fell from an average of five percent to 1.4 percent in 1918 and 1919. Another
complicating factor is that the US economy was gearing up military production
during this period – a form of stimulus of the economy.
To sum up, the best available historical data suggest
that, despite its horrendous human capital costs, the Spanish Flu did not
affect US economic activity in a significant way.
The
European data for the period of the Spanish Flu offer something of a natural experiment that allows us to abstract from the effects of World War I: By
focusing on non-combatant nations, we can get a somewhat cleaner look at the
Spanish flu’s impact. This does not mean
that the war did not affect economic activity in the non-combatant countries,
just that its effects were less distortive than in the combatant countries.
Figure
2 shows a clear decline in GDP for European
non-combatant countries in 1918, averaging some seven percent. However, the
losses of output in non-Spanish-Flu years of 1917 and 1921 were equally large.
For
the first quarter of the 20th century, the Spanish Flu appears to be
just one of many economic setbacks for Europe. Much longer time series from
Maddison cement the conclusion that 1918-19 does not especially stand out as a
significant economic event.
(Figure
2 here)
The
United Kingdom was a combatant in World War 1
but did not serve as a battlefield. The Spanish Flu peaked in the UK
after the November 1918 armistice, as troops returned home in cramped rail cars
and transport ships.
Figure
3 shows 1918 to be a year of modest or zero GDP growth. As the Spanish
Flu made its way into the UK in 1919, the economy went into decline, falling 12
percent according to Maddison and 7 percent according to the Bank of England
figures.
The
years following the Spanish Flu were difficult ones, with substantial declines
in 1920 and 1921. UK growth did not resume until 1922. There is a massive
literature on the multiple causes of the UK’s “interwar slump.” Major surveys of this
literature do not mention the Spanish Flu as a cause.
(Figure
3 here)
The
broad conclusion to be drawn from Figures 1-3 is that, despite its immense
demographic damage, the Spanish Flu did not depress economic activity in the US
and Europe in a significant fashion. The UK was a possible exception but
experts on the UK’s interwar slump blame a number of factors other than the
Spanish Flu.