Lessons from History: The Twentieth Anniversary of the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979. In the nine year war that followed, the Soviets lost 15,000 killed and 54,000 wounded. Tens of thousands of Afghan veterans returned with severe drug addictions and formed criminal gangs. The Soviet Afghan debacle played a key role in the end of the USSR in December of 1991.

Twenty years ago, on February 15, 1989, the Soviet Union completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan. It left behind a Soviet-backed government headed by the former chief of the Afghan secret police, Mohammad Najibullah, which controlled Kabul and other cities but not the countryside. Thanks to the disarray of rival forces, the Soviet puppet government lasted until April of 1992 as tribal and religious factions battled for control. The rest is known – the installation of Taliban rule, the harboring of Al Qaeda, and the defeat of the Taliban state in 2001. This twentieth anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal offers a timely benchmark to reexamine the USSR’s Afghan experience, particularly as attention turns from Iraq to the “good war” in Afghanistan. The Soviet withdrawal came after nine years; US and Nato forces are now in their eighth year.

The Soviet experience was succinctly summarized in a top secret memo co-authored by six of Gorbachev’s top advisors (including his foreign minister and KGB head) dated January 23, 1989 (copies of which are in the Hoover Institution archives). The USSR had bound itself by the April 1988 Geneva Accords to withdraw its forces by a deadline of February 1989. The memo to Gorbachev stated that the Afghan government could hold its position “only with the help of our aviation” and warned that opposition forces had reduced hostilities in anticipation of the Soviet withdrawal. The limited ground for hope was the armed struggle among opposition forces, which might escalate after the Soviet withdrawal. Although the Afghan allies “understood the decision for the Soviet withdrawal”, they were pushing hard for continued air strikes from Soviet territory, which would be “critical” to their survival. Although Gorbachev’s advisors appeared skeptical of the ability of Afghan allies to use advanced Soviet weaponry, their possession “might give them confidence in their power.” Neither significant air strikes nor massive weapon deliveries were authorized.

Gorbachev’s advisors did not downplay that the Najibullah regime, which “the entire world associates with us,” was hanging by a thread. Their biggest fear was that America and Pakistan would finally succeed in unifying opposition forces. The most immediate threat, however, was a blockade of Kabul and other cities, preventing foodstuffs from entering. There were no good options, because up to a full division would be required to keep the roads open. Another idea, floated and then rejected, was to call for UN troops, citing the threat of a human catastrophe to keep Soviet convoy troops in place until UN forces arrived. What was left was economic aid, which “despite the many difficulties we and the Afghans encountered in their delivery and distribution, prevented many undesirable turns in the development of the situation.”
The only remaining assistance to the Najibullah regime would be to maintain contacts and keep tabs on the opposition located in Pakistan, Iran and Europe and to drive a wedge between the “extremists” and the “moderates.” The Soviet Union would also use its security council membership to influence the UN and to work with all governments involved in the Afghan conflict, especially Pakistan.

Do the United States and its allies face a Soviet-like debacle in Afghanistan? There are similarities between the Soviet and US experiences. In both cases, the Afghan regime had control of cities but not of the vast countryside. The list of interfering neighbors (Pakistan and Iran) is the same, and the success in training a loyal and effective Afghan military was limited. The Russians and later the Americans and their Nato allies basically have had to fight insurgents on their own. The key differences are that the Soviets installed unpopular puppets, even using disguised KGB forces to execute non-cooperative Afghan politicians, while the Americans insisted on democratic elections. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan with almost universal condemnation; whereas the U.S. entry garnered considerable international support, given the ill repute of the Taliban regime. Soviet forces matched the cruelty of their Afghan foes with incredible barbarism and atrocities on both sides. The American and Nato forces have attempted to fight a conventional counter-insurgency war. Although current Afghan opposition forces are far from united, the Soviets had the advantage of facing a much more fractured and factious opposition.

Bukharin's Dream

12. April 1938: Internal NKVD Prison: A Beautiful Dream

Bukharin slept fitfully in his small prison cell in the Internal Prison of the NKVD, in the bowels of the Lubyanka, a half mile from the Kremlin. His nocturnal writing was interrupted by fitful sleep, often indistinguishable from hallucinations. In his dreams, Bukharin would see Stalin and Nadezhda [Stalin’s wife who committed suicide]. In one, Nadezhda came to him and asked “What are they doing with you? I’ll tell Iosif [Stalin] that he should come for you. The dream was so real that Bukharin wanted to awake and immediately write to Stalin to come to take him from this place. He knew that Nadezhda would never believe that he would do something bad against Stalin. Bukharin’s dream continued. He talked with Stalin more than a hour. His wish was that Stalin could see how devoted he was to him. In another more pastoral dream, he found himself playing with his own and Stalin’s daughter, both Svetlanas, in the wooded dacha compound shared by prominent Bolshevik leaders outside of Moscow. Svetlana’s mother was still alive, and she ran the household with discipline. He dreamed of the animals he raised there and the children’s delight as they played with them. He dreamed how, in the evenings, they would gather outside and sing with even Stalin chiming in with his soft but pleasant voice accompanied by the balalaika.As he waked to the harsh reality of his prison cell, he remembered an exchange in the summer of 1928 in which Stalin said to him: “You know why I treasure you…. You are not capable to intrigue? He remembered his answer. “Yes, but at that very time I ran to Kamenev. Whether you believe it or not, this fact stands out in my mind as the original sin stands out for the Jews. My god, was I a child and a fool.”

Excerpt from The Leper and the Bolshevik's Daughter: Nikolai and Anna Bukharin

Will the Real Dmitry Medvedev Stand Up?

Few commentators read Dmitry Medvedev’s November 15, 2008 presidential address in its entirety. Medvedev speaks as a hawk on foreign policy, blasting Tbilisi’s “adventurism” which was a “pretext for NATO naval vessels to enter the Black Sea” and to “speed up the imposition of an American missile defense system on Europe.” Most readers did not go beyond this point, concluding Putin and Medvedev are one. The rest of the address, however, takes a quite different tack. It emphasizes the need to defend the Constitution (which gives him an advantage over Putin) and is full of veiled attacks on Putin’s way of governing. Medvedev is allying himself with popular sentiments on foreign policy while cautiously probing popular weaknesses in domestic policy that he may wish to explore in the future.
Let me cite what I regard as the key anti-Putin quote in the address:
“The cult of the state and the illusory wisdom of the administrative apparatus have prevailed in Russia over many centuries. Individuals with their rights and freedoms, personal interests and problems, have been seen as at best a means and at worst an obstacle for strengthening the state’s might. But the bureaucracy still does not trust free citizens and free activity. This logic pushes it into dangerous conclusions and acts. The bureaucracy from time to time casts fear over the business world, pressuring it to keep in line and not to take what they consider wrong action, takes control of this or that media outlet, trying to stop it from saying what they consider the wrong thing, meddles in the electoral process, preventing the election of what they consider the wrong person, and puts pressure on the courts, stopping them from handing down what they consider the wrong verdict. The result is that the state bureaucracy is the biggest employer, most active publisher, best producer, and is its own court, own political party, and ultimately its own people. This is a completely ineffective system and leads only to corruption. ..But an all-powerful bureaucracy is a mortal danger for civil society. This is why our society must continue calm and steady work to build up its democratic institutions and not delay this work.”
Medvedev is Putin’sonly potential challenger. Perhaps Putin has some means of making sure he stays loyal; perhaps not. Medvedev’s anti-Putin remarks are perhaps “cheap talk”. The typical Russian succession is one of like thinkers. Vested interests have much to lose and will fight change tooth and mail. If Medvedev does replace Putin, will he make a difference? The odds are that he would not, despite his brave words.

Stalin's Reach from the Grave: The Moscow Stalin Conference

Russian and foreign scholars dazzled at the marbled luxury of the Olympic Renaissance that welcomed them on December 5 to the International Conference on Stalinism. Organizers included Memorial (whose Petersburg offices were raided during the conference), and the commissioner on human rights. The Yeltsin Foundation provided the funding. The conference’s goal was to “narrow the gap between the scientific viewpoint and everyday understanding of Stalinism,” which “peddles dictatorship and historical justification of violence, millions of victims, and cleansing through social purges.” Clearly Stalin’s soaring public opinion “rating” were a sore point. More than four hundred signed to attend. Some, including disappointed journalists, had to be turned away.

To the packed crowd, Russia’s top archival historian, Oleg Khelvnyuk, began by listing Stalin’s “mass operations” which killed or imprisoned more than ten million, not counting war victims. Arsenii Roginsky, director of Memorial, followed with an impassioned address on the Stalin paradox – that there were millions of victims but no criminals! Instead of “crime without victims” Stalin somehow produced “victims without criminals,” by creating collective guilt for those who ran Russia after him. My presentation focused on “Was Stalin really Necessary?” stating we must weigh the costs of human life against the benefits cheerfully recited by apologists – rapid industrialization and the victory over Hitler (despite Stalin’s bungling of the first part of the war and his prewar extermination of the entire command structure).

The second day of the conference was devoted to breakout sessions. An agitated journalist, whose apartment had been ransacked that night, wondered whether this was retribution for attendance? Some vocal Stalinists had penetrated the conference (“Under Soviet rule we had everything!”). Eccentrics spun wild theories as anxious moderators to wrested the microphone from their resistant hands.

The conference’s peak was a round table of distinguished writers, film makers, lawyers, and journalists, most old enough to have experienced Stalinism first hand. The moderator, well-known TV commentator Nikolai Svanidze, did his best to control the crowded auditorium. Danil Granin, a war veteran, “frontovik”, recounted the creation of the war-leader Stalin myth as Stalin exiled Zhukov (the equivalent of Truman banishing Eisenhower to Mexico) as the war ended. Sigurd Schmidt, the son of a noted arctic expert, recalled that when the party purges began, people simply stopped talking. Visitors ceased coming to his father’s office. Russian human rights commissioner Vladimir Lukin, lived with his grandmother after his parents, dedicated communists, were imprisoned. Frightened by the racket of a trolley passing by, his grandmother, who had seen her innocent children imprisoned, comforted him that Soviet engineers had designed a quiet trolley but “enemies of the people” had sabotaged it. The greatest fireworks were reserved for the minister of education, Andrei Fursenko, who was repeatedly interrupted by shouts: “And what about the textbook?” The “textbook” was written by a little known historian and had been “approved” for use in Russian schools to teach the next generation about Soviet history and Stalin. The sputtering minister explained that the text had been approved by a meeting of teachers (an old Stalin trick), and even worse texts could have been chosen. As the next speaker was introduced, Fursenko discretely left the hall. The “text” claims that Stalin was forced by circumstances to embark on bold policies that, regrettably, demanded masses of victims. Putin himself is represented as another strong leader who rescues Russia from chaos and humiliation to preserve Russia’s rightful territory.

Did the conference achieve its goal? Scholars have the “facts” on their side, but they are read by a few thousand readers. The pro-Stalinist literature is available on every street corner in bright covers and short texts. These books “prove” that the archives are forgeries and scholars who use them are unpatriotic. Until we learn to communicate with a broader public, Stalin will continue to be a positive historical figure and the Putins and Medvedevs can continue to argue that Russia needs a strong hand.

Moscow Digs in Its Heels On the Katyn Massacre Once Again

On January 29, 2009 the Military Collegium of the Russian Supreme Court upheld the October 14, 2008 verdict of the Moscow regional court to terminate the investigation of the Katyn massacre of Polish officers in April and May of 1940. This October 14 verdict was appealed to the Supreme Court by lawyers representing the relatives of ten Polish POWs executed at Katyn. In its January 29 rejection, the Supreme Court confirmed the lower court’s finding that there had been no proper identification of the victims and rejected the exhumation records for three victims and the documentation of execution for the remaining seven submitted on behalf of their relatives. The second ground for rejection was the fact that the ten year limit of the Russian criminal code in effect on March 5, 1940 when the Politburo ordered the executions, had expired, and the case could not be reopened. Court decisions on cases of this magnitude are dictated by the Kremlin, and Russia’s refusal to recognize the victims of Katyn will continue to rile Polish-Russian relations. For more on the Katyn Massacre, see Exhuming Secrets, Hoover Digest by Paul R. Gregory and Maciej Siekierski. www.hoover.org/publications/digest/22787574.html

Seven Propositions: Russia, Foreign Policy, and the Financial Crisis

Although contemporary Russia resembles a jigsaw puzzle, there are some constants, which allow us to make some general predictions about what the future holds. These constants can be summarized as six propositions:

Proposition 1: Russia has become a KGB state and will behave as such in its domestic and international dealings unrestrained by the West.

The brief and chaotic flirtation with capitalism and democracy under Yeltsin ended at the turn of the millennium. Yeltsin and his oligarchs chose an unknown figure, Vladimir Putin, probably because of his KGB background, to guarantee Yeltsin’s safe retirement, to not change the results of privatization, and restore order. Putin kept his promise to Yeltsin, but drove uncooperative oligarchs into exile or prison, from whom he wrested control of the media. Putin’s media played up the danger of dark-skinned Central Asians and of the United States and NATO, and questioned the patriotism of opposition groups.
The expropriation of oligarchs through threats, the courts, the tax police, and direct force shifted power from “private” oligarchs to a “KGB state,” run by former KGB officers and their associates. The KGB state now commands industry, commerce, and banking, electronically monitors the population, controls nationalistic youth organizations, conducts covert operations at home and abroad, and operates its own prisons. Former KGB officers have accumulated incredible wealth, tied to their positions, which they lose if their positions vanish. They cannot tolerate any adverse change in the power structure in the high-stakes game of Russian politics.

Proposition 2: Russia is not motivated by conventional economic and political concerns. It will readily sacrifice economic gains to achieve its political goals.

KGB mentality says that the state, which the KGB represents and protects, is surrounded by evil forces that must be defeated. Were this not the case, the KGB state would not be needed. This battle must be conducted without mercy and without regard to conventional rules, and the KGB will win because its opponents are soft and are hampered by rules. The KGB state believes it can get away with the most extreme actions – a poisoning an enemy in a foreign capital, protecting the assassin with parliamentary immunity despite his clear plutonium trail, all evoking only a weak protest from the West. An invasion of Georgian territory planned well in advance becomes a defensive operation when Georgian forces are goaded into resistance . Its courts deny high-level responsibility for the Katyn massacre of Polish officers, despite indisputable archival evidence, and casually ignore Polish outrage. Investigative reporters are gunned down in broad daylight.
According to this KGB mentality, the purpose of business, especially big business, is to advance the interests of the state. Profits are secondary if they matter at all. Energy companies and transit pipelines serve as an arm of foreign policy. It does not matter whether the company is owned by the state. If private shareholders do not follow the dictates of the state, they will lose their investment. This philosophy explains the destruction of Yukos, the most efficient Russian energy company, the arbitrary expropriation of major Western investors by the courts, tax officials, and environmental agencies. Although Putin set a trillion dollar capitalization of Gazprom as a state goal, he willingly accepts its deeply-discounted capitalization in return for its doing his bidding in Ukraine and Europe.

Proposition 3: Putin and his administration will retain power even under extraordinary circumstances, such as extreme financial crisis.

The Russian KGB state is more bureaucratic than the Soviet period. This bureaucracy is divided into a number of interconnected “apparats” of back offices run by unelected officials, little known to the public and press but well known to one another. The KGB’s official apparat is the FSB agency, but beneath the surface is an unofficial network of former KGB officers, united by a common “corporate culture,” who run Russia’s large corporations, newspapers, television stations, courts, prosecutors’ offices, arms industry, and defense. This apparat is interwoven with (and often indistinguishable from) the Presidential Administration, which moved symbolically but not actually to the White House when Putin became Prime Minister. This apparat orders “telephone justice” (tell judges their verdicts), appoints officials, gathers compromising material, and orders character assassinations, poisonings, and contract killings.
Even under a weakened Yeltsin, his presidential apparat had the power to re-elect him, starting from a popularity rating of 5 percent. The Putin/Medvedev apparat dictates to television and media how to cover Chechnya, Georgia, or the financial crisis. When the financial crisis broke, the state media was instructed to avoid terms like “panic” or “collapse.” The United States was to blame anyway. The apparat decides what parties can run in elections; whether they can put up posters; the extent to which they will be harassed. It can even determine what ballots will be counted.
Putin insisted on unfair elections despite his soaring popularity, because he knew there could come a day when he would be less popular. Putin’s apparat’s control of political and economic life means that, no matter how bad the financial crisis, no matter how far the ruble drops, the governing apparat could easily win elections. They can do so more easily and with less manipulation with high popularity, but low popularity is manageable too. The lower the popularity, the more repressive the regime. It just ratchets up the costs of opposition.

Proposition 4: Political change will not come from below but only from the top. Unless the center unexpectedly names a remarkable leader (such as the Gorbachev exception in 1985) who is in charge will make little difference.

Russia-KGB Inc. does not need Putin to win elections. It an elect virtually anyone it wants. Putin, like Stalin before him, is the current leader and has huge incumbent advantages. Any “reform” challenger who wishes to do away with Russia-KGB, Inc. stands no chance. If the challenger did, he or she would likely not survive. Only Quixotic challengers, like Gary Kasparov or the ever-handy Communist Party, are allowed in the game.
Any effective challenge must come from within, and the only potential challenger is Dmitry Medvedev.
For reasons that remain unclear, Putin did not amend the Constitution to continue as President. Instead, he took the post of Prime Minister, and installed a young protégé in the presidency. Putin’s “rating” is four or five percentage points above Medvedev, but Medvedev’s three quarters approval is more than sufficient. Constitutionally, Medevedev is Putin’s clear superior. He can dismiss Putin at any time, even if the Putin-dominated Duma objects. The Russian Constitution gives Medvedev a clear path to Putin’s removal. Like Putin and Yeltsin before him, the removal of a prime minister was routine. With Putin, it would be less routine and perhaps doable, especially if Putin’s popularity plummets and a scapegoat is needed. What we do not know is whether Medvedev, who lacks a KGB background can win over the apparat. Without its support, Medvedev would fail.
The scenario for Putin’s removal would be a sharp fall in the ruble, reminiscent of the summer 1998 collapse and default. The justified distrust by foreign investors means no more currency inflows no matter how high the return; in the meantime, Russian citizen discard rubles. The falling price of oil means lower dollar earnings. Currently, the ruble has fallen some thirty percent, and Putin has declared that it will fall further. If it were to plummet, say, 50 percent, Putin’s rating could no longer defy gravity. KGB Russia could decide to sacrifice him. Medvedev would then appoint a new prime minister. This scenario is possible but unlikely. Putin’s most likely exit would be to declare victory – to retire because his protégé can handle the job alone. A number of influential people are probably rooting for this scenario. Medvedev is not without personal ambition. Oligarchs faced with margin calls would want a change if they are not given bailout funds. Putin, who himself betrayed the oligarchs who put him in charge, surely understands Stalin’s adage: “Loyalty is a malady that affects dogs.”

Proposition 5: Putin’s Russia, like Stalin’s USSR, requires external enemies to justify itself. Therefore, there are few if any meaningful areas of cooperation or common interest with the West.

The KGB state mindset does not allow a scenario of a peaceful world of cooperating nations. It subscribes to Putin’s description of the loss of the Soviet Empire as the greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century. The immutability of this mindset is also captured in Putin’s expression: “Once KGB, always KGB.” Any support that the U.S. or NATO offers the Baltic states, Ukraine, Central Asia, or Eastern Europe will automatically be interpreted as anti-Russian. The encirclement by hostile powers also provides the justification for repression at home. Notice that virtually all “enemies” of KGB Russia are characterized as agents or pawns of foreign powers, instead of domestic enemies of the KGB state and what it stands for. It is therefore naïve for U.S. policy makers to think that they can make friends with Russia. This does not deny that some minor areas of overlapping interests might be found.

Proposition 6: Russia’s anti-Western foreign policy is popular with the Russian people.

If we examine the most recent polls of the Russian people, they show more satisfaction with foreign policy than with domestic policy. Only nine percent say that Russian foreign policy is too tough on the West. Only 12 percent of Russians are positive on NATO (63 percent are negative). These views are reinforced by the state media, of course, but they capture something deeper in the Russian mentality.