Qadaffi is an experienced despot; otherwise he would not have held office for forty years. He knows how to calculate the best ways to stay in power.
By my count, Qadaffi can be defeated in four ways: 1) His inner circle overthrows him (and most likely kills him). 2) He voluntarily leaves the country. 3) He is defeated by an opposition army supported by foreign forces. 4) He is killed by a targeted missile (or even a stray one). Option 2 is hard to gauge. We do not know whether Gadaffi is a coward or, more likely, a pragmatic survivor. My own guess is that he will decide his best chance for survival is to stay in Libya and win. Once he leaves, his fate will be determined by others. Options 3-4 are a matter of chance and are unpredictable. Foreign powers, it appears, will not join forces with Libyan rebels, and the Anti-Gadaffi alliance does not seem to have the stomach for assassination by missile.
If history is a guide, the most likely option is number 1: The dictator is killed by his inner circle. Despots, contrary to the Hollywood scenes of an angry mob storming the palace, are killed by their closest associates (Caesar: Et tu, Brute?). The one execution of a dictator as the Soviet empire collapsed was Nicola Ceausescu, whose inner circle lined him and his wife up before a wall and shot them.
Qadaffi’s most immediate concern therefore is to prevent a winning coalition from forming within his inner circle.
Political scientist Bruce Beuno de Mesquita proposes a simple and common sense formula for the conditions under which a coalition unseats an incumbent dictator: The dictator’s inner circle ultimately decides whether the dictator stays or goes. A winning anti-incumbent coalition must offer the inner circle an expected reward for betrayal that exceeds that of the status quo. The term “expected” shows why the incumbent dictator has a huge advantage. Potential conspirators have two unknowns: Will the coup be successful? If successful, will the new dictator deliver the promised reward? If either of these has a low probability, the incumbent dictator stays in office.
This brings us to defector math. Qadaffi is well aware that the main threat comes from his inner circle, but he does not know who his most likely enemies are. His inner circle knows that they are already in extreme danger. He must be evaluating each of them to asses the chances of betrayal. Those who occupy “power positions,” such as head of the secret police, militia, or military are most dangerous. They actually have the power to unseat him. Economic or diplomatic officials pose a lesser threat. A Qadaffi would rather err on the side of eliminating a loyal follower than sparing a rival. Family or clan members are in the least danger. Blood runs thicker than water.
The optimal course of action for the inner circle is for them to defect as soon as possible. But their defection actually serves the interest of the dictator. Defecting potential rivals remove themselves from the inner circle and can no longer organize or be a part of a coalition to unseat him. Another benefit is that the inner circle becomes a smaller tight-knit group of clear loyalists.
The Western press depicts defections as a sign that Qadaffi’s hold on power is weakening. According to defector math, however, defections strengthen the dictator. In a power struggle like this, it is not particularly relevant to Qadaffi whether Western governments think he is weakening or not. What matters most to him is what is going on inside his inner circle.
We have historical examples that show that defections do not weaken a dictator’s hold on power. Fidel Castro allowed massive defections to remove potential trouble makers from his island. Saddam Hussein’s regime suffered many defections, but none of them played a decisive role in unseating him. Belarus dictator Lukashenko has actively encouraged regime opponents to defect, and he remains in power.
Qadaffi’s likely reaction to each defector is: “Good by and good riddance. I’ll catch up with you later.”
Showing posts with label Kadaffi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kadaffi. Show all posts
Sunday, April 3, 2011
Friday, March 11, 2011
Let’s Face It. Gaddafi Has Won
As the Western powers dither and deliberate, Gaddafi has won. He will stay in power even if we establish no-fly zones or impose sanctions with sharp teeth. Short of actual invasion, Gaddafi will stay in power and will likely pass his power on to his sons when he dies. The Western press will continue to hope as a civil war continues, but its outcome is preordained.
There is a prominent historical pattern which explains why Gaddafi has won. There are virtually no cases of unconstrained dictators being overthrown. An unconstrained dictator is a Stalin, a Kim Il Sung, a Saddam, and a Gaddafi who is willing to take any measure, no matter how brutal or repulsive, to stay in power.
The state security organizations of unconstrained dictators reach even down into neighborhoods and report directly to them; prison or worse is the price even modest dissidents pay; they shoot first, not particularly worrying whether their victim is a threat or not. They make the price of resistance of any kind so high that only a brave few are willing to take the risk. Any potential rival is a dead man.
These brutal measures have served unconstrained dictators well. Stalin in his three decades of rule faced not a single assassination attempt. (There were two attempts on Lenin’s life in the early days of Bolshevik power. He had not yet had time to build his state security network). Father and son, Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung, ruled North Korea for a half century despite incredible economic failure and deprivation of their people too downtrodden to resist.
The recent events in the Middle East have taught us a new and bitter lesson: Even mass popular uprisings are not enough to topple an unconstrained dictator. We had hoped that popular uprisings would eventually topple the Iranian mullahs, Syria’s Assad, and Kim Il Sung. The Libyan experience proves that they can survive almost an entire nation rising up against them. They do so by killing as many people as necessary and by placing a high price on any form of resistance.
Popular uprisings are, however, sufficient to topple constrained dictators, as Mubarak’s experience in Egypt shows. Earlier the constrained Shah fell to a popular uprising and even the East German dictatorship was unwilling to use force against demonstrators in Leipzig.
The few cases of overthrow of unconstrained dictator take the form of internal coups and invasions. The Romanian dictator Ceausescu was shot dead by his inner circle after being booed by a crowd. Beria, Stalin’s head of state security, was executed by his Kremlin colleagues, when he tried to succeed the deceased Stalin. Hitler committed suicide before Soviet troops reached his bunker.
What signal does past and current history send to constrained dictators? What message does it send to Chavez in Venezuela, Ortega in Nicaragua, Hamas in Lebanon, or Assad in Syria? The message is that only the most vicious and brutal dictators survive. There is no payoff from restraint. “Reforms” will do them no good and are to the contrary quite dangerous. They will heed Machiavelli’s advice that the “prince must learn to be less good..
A Libyan civil war will likely follow the pattern of the Russian civil war. In this civil war, there were almost a half million executions, as the Red Army and the Cheka carried out Lenin’s Red Terror. The White forces were divided and more timid (except the Cossacks, who matched the Reds in brutality). The interventionist forces used only half measures and pulled out with their tales between their legs. Tribal enmity will likely keep a Libyan war going for a while but the outcome is not in question.
If history shows that palace coups are the most likely way to topple an unconstrained dictator, should US policy aim at promoting an insider conspiracy among Gaddafi's lieutenants? I am sure that Gaddafi has organized his state security to prevent just that. The odds of an outsider successfully organizing a palace coup are about zero. Even if a palace coup worked, the result would likely be a new leader slightly less bad than Gaddafi.
There is a prominent historical pattern which explains why Gaddafi has won. There are virtually no cases of unconstrained dictators being overthrown. An unconstrained dictator is a Stalin, a Kim Il Sung, a Saddam, and a Gaddafi who is willing to take any measure, no matter how brutal or repulsive, to stay in power.
The state security organizations of unconstrained dictators reach even down into neighborhoods and report directly to them; prison or worse is the price even modest dissidents pay; they shoot first, not particularly worrying whether their victim is a threat or not. They make the price of resistance of any kind so high that only a brave few are willing to take the risk. Any potential rival is a dead man.
These brutal measures have served unconstrained dictators well. Stalin in his three decades of rule faced not a single assassination attempt. (There were two attempts on Lenin’s life in the early days of Bolshevik power. He had not yet had time to build his state security network). Father and son, Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung, ruled North Korea for a half century despite incredible economic failure and deprivation of their people too downtrodden to resist.
The recent events in the Middle East have taught us a new and bitter lesson: Even mass popular uprisings are not enough to topple an unconstrained dictator. We had hoped that popular uprisings would eventually topple the Iranian mullahs, Syria’s Assad, and Kim Il Sung. The Libyan experience proves that they can survive almost an entire nation rising up against them. They do so by killing as many people as necessary and by placing a high price on any form of resistance.
Popular uprisings are, however, sufficient to topple constrained dictators, as Mubarak’s experience in Egypt shows. Earlier the constrained Shah fell to a popular uprising and even the East German dictatorship was unwilling to use force against demonstrators in Leipzig.
The few cases of overthrow of unconstrained dictator take the form of internal coups and invasions. The Romanian dictator Ceausescu was shot dead by his inner circle after being booed by a crowd. Beria, Stalin’s head of state security, was executed by his Kremlin colleagues, when he tried to succeed the deceased Stalin. Hitler committed suicide before Soviet troops reached his bunker.
What signal does past and current history send to constrained dictators? What message does it send to Chavez in Venezuela, Ortega in Nicaragua, Hamas in Lebanon, or Assad in Syria? The message is that only the most vicious and brutal dictators survive. There is no payoff from restraint. “Reforms” will do them no good and are to the contrary quite dangerous. They will heed Machiavelli’s advice that the “prince must learn to be less good..
A Libyan civil war will likely follow the pattern of the Russian civil war. In this civil war, there were almost a half million executions, as the Red Army and the Cheka carried out Lenin’s Red Terror. The White forces were divided and more timid (except the Cossacks, who matched the Reds in brutality). The interventionist forces used only half measures and pulled out with their tales between their legs. Tribal enmity will likely keep a Libyan war going for a while but the outcome is not in question.
If history shows that palace coups are the most likely way to topple an unconstrained dictator, should US policy aim at promoting an insider conspiracy among Gaddafi's lieutenants? I am sure that Gaddafi has organized his state security to prevent just that. The odds of an outsider successfully organizing a palace coup are about zero. Even if a palace coup worked, the result would likely be a new leader slightly less bad than Gaddafi.
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