Despite protestations that we are not after regime change, the allied bombing makes no sense unless this is our goal. Our stated objective is to reduce civilian casualties, but if Qadaffi remains in power, the loss of civilian lives will be huge as he wreaks his revenge on anyone he suspects of disloyalty or even wavering. Civilian losses near the battlefield will be trivial compared to a surviving Qadaffi’s political repressions. We can only protect civilian lives by getting rid of him. I suspect everyone understands this but cannot speak the words “Kill Qadaffi!”.
A second thought: I wonder how the American public’s stomach will hold up when Qadaffi starts displaying civilian casualties. If there are none, he can always create some. The media’s sympathies are against Qadaffi, but they will not be able to ignore the story when he piles up the bodies and women and children. These grisly displays will run counter to the French, British and U.S. militaries’ descriptions of antiseptic surgical strikes. The outrage of antiwar groups in the U.S. and Europe, who do not like cost-benefit analysis of casualties, will rise to the boiling point.
I must confess that I am puzzled by China’s and Russia’s abstentions at the U.N. Security Council. Their votes might be less puzzling if Qadaffi were clearly on his way out, but the outcome is up for grabs. Russia is remarkably consistent; Putin gains from stirring the pot of unrest. Uncertainty raises oil prices, which he desperately needs to repair his state finances. Russia likes to side against the U.S. in just about any and all matters. China’s abstention is even more puzzling. China is consistent in opposing any outside intervention to strike at political oppression. They understand that attention could turn to them at some point.
If Qadaffi survives the first week of bombardments and turns this into a protracted civil war, he can win. Russia and China will raise their level of criticism. Anti-war sentiment will rise as civilian casualties mount. Qadaffi can move beyond the immediate emergency to the slaughter of opponents in areas he controls.
Paul R. Gregory's writings on Russia, the world economy, and other matters that he finds of interest.
Showing posts with label Un resolution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Un resolution. Show all posts
Monday, March 21, 2011
Friday, March 18, 2011
Qadaffi’s “Cease Fire:” What Would Stalin Do?
Republicans sometimes ask: “What would Reagan do? Christians ask: “What would Christ have done in this situation.” Dictators like Qadaffi, Saddam Hussein, and Kim Il Sung could ask the same question of their patron saint: Josif Stalin. Stalin wrote the playbook for dictators – how to grab and hold onto power. In actuality, unconstrained dictators, of the Stalin type like Qadaffi, do not need his advice. They became brutal dictators by being the best specialists in political terror. They intuitively understand what Stalin would have advised.
Qadaffi’s “victory within 48 hours” appears to have been snatched away at the last minute by the remarkable U.N resolution to establish a no fly zone and apply necessary force to save civilians. Qadaffi’s road to survival has unexpectedly become rockier. What would we expect the Qadaffi/Stalin dictator to do next?
First, like Stalin, Qadaffi would be most frightened of the threat of external force. Stalin signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact at great cost to head off Hitler’s troops. Qadaffi, likewise, will do anything necessary to head off any foreign intervention. He will promise to abide by a cease fire. He will assure the outside world that he values civilian life, and will do everything necessary to protect his people “who love him” He will continue to hold territory his loyalists occupy and will probe only at the margins – never giving outside forces a reason to act.
Second, like Stalin, Qadaffi understands that the external threat will hearten his domestic enemies, which he now understands are everywhere. Any increase in the external threat must be countered by extreme political repression in territories he holds, especially Tripoli. Like Stalin, he understands that the ensuing bloodbath must be kept as quiet as possible. Western journalists must be kept away at any cost, even if it means killing them. Arrests will take place at night. Neighbors know that if they say anything, they are next.
Third, like Stalin, Qadaffi will upgrade his propaganda efforts, what Stalin called "mobilization." In this case, he lacks Stalin’s advantages of gullible Western intellectuals and journalists who sympathize with his cause of “building socialism.” Qadaffi, who has few remaining friends, will be hard pressed to find his NYT’s Walter Duranty or Guardian reporters to deny the Ukrainian famine or vouch for the veracity of his Moscow Show Trials. Qadaffi does have cash; maybe he can find some mouthpieces who can make his case credibly and make a difference.
Fourth, like Stalin, Qadaffi will shorten the leash on his state security apparatus. His state security officers will receive outrageous benefits and will be given to understand the price of disloyalty. The control of state and security will devolve to his immediate family and most trusted loyalists.
Will Qadaffi survive by employing these tactics? Unless the Western powers are willing to bomb Qadaffi troops that are, by all intents and purposes scrupulously observing a case fire, he has a good chance.
Qadaffi’s “victory within 48 hours” appears to have been snatched away at the last minute by the remarkable U.N resolution to establish a no fly zone and apply necessary force to save civilians. Qadaffi’s road to survival has unexpectedly become rockier. What would we expect the Qadaffi/Stalin dictator to do next?
First, like Stalin, Qadaffi would be most frightened of the threat of external force. Stalin signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact at great cost to head off Hitler’s troops. Qadaffi, likewise, will do anything necessary to head off any foreign intervention. He will promise to abide by a cease fire. He will assure the outside world that he values civilian life, and will do everything necessary to protect his people “who love him” He will continue to hold territory his loyalists occupy and will probe only at the margins – never giving outside forces a reason to act.
Second, like Stalin, Qadaffi understands that the external threat will hearten his domestic enemies, which he now understands are everywhere. Any increase in the external threat must be countered by extreme political repression in territories he holds, especially Tripoli. Like Stalin, he understands that the ensuing bloodbath must be kept as quiet as possible. Western journalists must be kept away at any cost, even if it means killing them. Arrests will take place at night. Neighbors know that if they say anything, they are next.
Third, like Stalin, Qadaffi will upgrade his propaganda efforts, what Stalin called "mobilization." In this case, he lacks Stalin’s advantages of gullible Western intellectuals and journalists who sympathize with his cause of “building socialism.” Qadaffi, who has few remaining friends, will be hard pressed to find his NYT’s Walter Duranty or Guardian reporters to deny the Ukrainian famine or vouch for the veracity of his Moscow Show Trials. Qadaffi does have cash; maybe he can find some mouthpieces who can make his case credibly and make a difference.
Fourth, like Stalin, Qadaffi will shorten the leash on his state security apparatus. His state security officers will receive outrageous benefits and will be given to understand the price of disloyalty. The control of state and security will devolve to his immediate family and most trusted loyalists.
Will Qadaffi survive by employing these tactics? Unless the Western powers are willing to bomb Qadaffi troops that are, by all intents and purposes scrupulously observing a case fire, he has a good chance.
Labels:
cease fire,
dictator,
Qadaffi,
Stalin,
Un resolution
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