Showing posts with label China energy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China energy. Show all posts

Thursday, March 1, 2012

Kleptocrats, Oligarchs, and Billionaire Entrepreneurs

(Note: I posted this back in 2011. Someone stole my domain name back then so I am reposting it now. It seems relevant given Russia's March 4 presidential election)

Personal wealth is created in one of two ways. On the positive side, it arises as a result of innovation, hard work, brilliant insights, or even luck. Entrepreneurs create enormous wealth when they have a better idea (Henry Ford’s assembly line), discover and develop new products (Microsoft Windows or Google’s search engine), see a new business model (Sam Walton), or are simply at the right place at the right time. Often, it is a combination of innovation and timing, something economists call network externalities.

A second and negative route to personal wealth is through political connections, lobbying to obtain benefits from the state, violence to remove competitors, or outright theft of public resources. Those who earn their fortunes the first way create jobs, raise productivity, and contribute to economic welfare. Those who use the second route are “rent seekers” who subtract from growth and welfare for their own benefit.

Bill Gates, Sam Walton, and Sergei Brin represent wealth earned through entrepreneurship. Their Microsoft, Walmart, and Google made them not only among the richest persons in the world. They have created new technologies, hundreds of thousands of jobs, new business models, and have revolutionized they way we gather and process information. Carlos Slim, the world’s wealthiest man, made his fortune by monopolizing Mexico’s telecommunications market (presumably with help from government regulators). Poor Mexicans have been denied the wide range of choice of telephone services that others have and pay for his wealth in the form of the highest telephone rates on the continent.

The most egregious rent seeking occurs in autocratic and dictatorial regimes in which wealth accumulation is not constrained by an electorate, corporate transparency, or a free press. Such authoritarian regimes breed kleptocrats –those who accumulate wealth for themselves through their official positions. Oligarchs are those who use their access to those in power to accumulate wealth. Both kleptocrats and oligarchs transfer assets from society or from others to themselves; they do not create new products or additional jobs. They reduce economic welfare by crowding out real entrepreneurs, who refrain from economic activity knowing the fruits of their labor will be stolen. Kleptocracy and oligarchy are determined by the quality of society’s institutions and rule of law. The better the institutions, the more limited kleptocracy and oligarchy.

I present here some data on the world’s kleptocrats, oligarchs, and top entrepreneurs. The wealth of kleptocrats cannot be measured with any degree of precision because, as heads of state or government officials, they wish to conceal it. However, the figures capture rough orders of magnitude. Oligarchs, not being government heads or officials, are less prone to conceal their wealth. They may even feel a sense of pride when they see their names listed in Forbes.

I begin with a ranking of kleptocrat heads of state by absolute wealth. (I convert the wealth of past kleptocrats into current dollars). Four of the top six rule (or ruled) countries with rich natural resources (Putin, Nazarbaev, Aliev, Mobutu), such as energy or diamonds. The real “oil curse” is therefore the tendency of the rulers of mineral-rich countries to steal the national wealth. Other kleptocrats controlled poor countries lacking access to rich natural resources. The recently deposed Mubarak (whose personal wealth is listed at the maximum estimate) is in the middle range of notable kleptocrats. Of the eleven countries represented, four (Philippines, Indonesia, Nicaragua, and Peru) have subsequently democratized, although Nicaragua’s democracy may be shaky. Democracy strikes at the root causes of kleptocracy by making the rulers accountable to an electorate and investigative journalists.


Ruler(ranked top to bottom)YearWealth (bl. 2010 $)
Putin (Russia)201140
Suharto (Indonesia)1998 25
Nazarbaev Kazakhstan)201120
Marcos (Philippines)19867.5
Aliev (Azerbaijan)201110
Mobutu (Congo, Zaire)19975
Mubarak (Egypt)20115
Abacha (Nigeria)19983.5
Milosevich (Serbia)20001
Duvalier (Haiti)19860.55
Fujimori (Peru)20000.6
Alemain (Nicaragua)20020.1
Estrada (Philippines)20010.08

Heads of state who steal from less populous countries (Serbia, Haiti, and Nicaragua) accumulate less wealth ceteris paribus than those in populous economies (Russia, Indonesia and Nigeria). The grazing ground for kleptocrats is less spacious in poor countries than in rich countries. The percentage of the kleptocrat’s wealth to GDP is a measure of the kleptocrat-head-of-state’s s burden on society. This table shows that Mobutu, at the end of his reign in Congo, had accumulated wealth equal to more than forty percent of the nation’s meager output. Duvalier had accumulated an estimated ten percent – a figure comparable to the Central Asian oil magnates of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Marcos and Suharto are in the three to four percent range, whereas Putin and Milosevic are in the one to two percent range.

Ranked top to bottomYearPercent of GDP
Mobutu (Congo, Zaire)19970.4202
Aliev (Azerbaijan)20110.1111
Nazarbaev (Kazakhstan)20110.1036
Duvalier (Haiti)19860.1000
Marcos (Philippines)19860.0429
Suharto (Indonesia)19980.0331
Putin (Russia)20110.0180
Milosevich (Serbia)20000.0165
Abacha (Nigeria)19980.0127
Mubarak (Egypt)20110.0100
Alemain (Nicaragua)2002 0.0073
Fujimori (Peru)20000.0029
Estrada (Philippines)20010.0003

It should be noted that these figures show the economic burden imposed only by the head of state. Heads of state have their courts, which share in the plunder of resources. The court’s assets are not calculable, but we imagine that, if they could be included as well, the kleptocratic burden would be multiplied many times over.

The next table shows the cumulated wealth of the ten wealthiest persons in industrialized democracies (the United States, the European Union, and South Korea), in two former Soviet states (Russia and Ukraine), Mexico and in China. These figures omit the wealth of the head of state.

The table shows that the top ten have more wealth in the large and wealthy United States and European Union (between 170 and 270 billion). Relatively poor Mexico and Russia both have nearly one hundred billion. (There are as many billionaires listed for “poor” Russia as for the “rich” United States – a remarkable testimony to rent seeking in Putin’s Russia.) The top ten in South Korea and Ukraine have the same amount of wealth even though South Korea is five times richer. China lies between Mexico and Ukraine although it has the world’s second largest economy.

Ranked top to bottomWealth of Top 10 (bln $)
US264.8
EU (without UK)171.5
Russia97.0
Mexico90.3
China42.3
South Korea21.4
Ukraine17.7

The US top 10 list is comprised largely of entrepreneurs whose ideas and business methods changed whole industries (Gates, Buffet, Walton, and Brin). The Russian top 10 list is made up of Kremlin-favored oligarchs who were awarded extremely valuable assets that had previously belonged to the state. The South Korean list is populated by industrialists who formed conglomerate businesses that compete in world markets, while the Ukrainian list is made up of those who received valuable state assets during privatization. China’s list is of industrialist owners of successful Chinese companies (most partially owned with the state), who could not have been successful without the support of the Chinese state.

The next table shows the wealth of the top ten as a percent of GDP. In those countries (US, EU, South Korea) where the top wealth holders play primarily entrepreneurial roles, their share is between one and two percent. Viewed in the light of their contribution to the economy, their wealth reward seems rather modest. In Ukraine and Russia, the share of GDP of the top ten is between four and six percent – a rather substantial return to those making a negative or questionable contributions to output and welfare. The high Mexican share is due to the “Carlos Slim Effect.” He alone accounts for most of the high Mexican figure.

Top 10 PersonsWealth of top 10 as percent of GDP
Ukraine0.0586
Mexico0.0583
Russia0.0437
US0.0184
South Korea0.0147
EU (without UK)0.0113
China0.0042

China is an outlier. The wealth of its richest persons is small relative to the size of the Chinese economy. What this suggests is that there are forces at play, other than the usual constraints imposed by democracy and a free press, that have limited rapacious rent seeking on the part of connected Chinese businessmen . At this juncture, we do not know enough about the internal workings of large Chinese businesses to define the entrepreneurial roles played by their chief executives. These constraints on rent seeking in China may be one of the many (still unexplored) reasons for China’s rapid growth.

The basic message of this analysis is that, in countries with good institutions, generous wealth accumulation is a reward for positive contributions to the economy. These are rewards for innovation, radically new ideas, persistence, and risk taking. In societies with good institutions, the rewards are relatively modest as a percent of total economic activity. These rewards are constrained by competition, social morays, and the rule of law. In countries with poor institution, wealth is accumulated either by the head of state or by oligarch cronies by transferring assets from others or from society itself. Such transfers not only do not increase national wealth; they reduce it insofar as real entrepreneurs cannot prosper in such an environment.

We are often reminded of the greed of those at the top. Little attention is devoted to the contributions of those entrepreneurs whose ideas and methods have contributed to economic growth. Walmart, Microsoft and Google currently employ 2.1 million, 93,000, and 22,000 respectively. The indirect employment they create through suppliers, vendors and other stakeholders is a multiple of these figures. Their annual payrolls equal a large fraction of the accumulated wealth of their founders.

Warnings about the growing concentration of wealth at the very top must be considered in proportion to the size of economic activity, whose increase is in fact positively affected by those at the top. Today, the top ten account for less than two percent of GDP in the United States. At the turn of the twentieth century, the top ten accounted for more than five percent! In a ranking of the 100 top wealth holders from the founding of the United States to the present (as a percent of GDP), only five living persons are listed, and Gates and Buffet are ranked only numbers 31 and 39 respectively.

Data sources: This data is drawn from Forbes rankings of the world’s richest people, from estimates of Transparency International, and independent estimates of the wealth of Vladimir Putin and informal estimates of the wealth of Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan and the Aliev family of Azerbaijan. The wealth of other kleptocrats is given as of the date of their removal from power converted into 2010 US dollars. The top five Ukrainian oligarchs are taken from http://ukrainianguide.com/5-wealthiest-ukrainian-oligarchs/2/ Only five Ukrainian oligarchs made the billionaire list; so I assume there are five more slightly below one billion. Mubarak’s wealth is taken from an ABC News report of February 11, 2011 citing U.S. intelligence sources. These sources dismiss the high figures cited in the press and place Mubarak’s wealth between $1 and $5 billion. I take the upper figure to avoid underestimation. The wealthiest 100 Americans throughout history is taken from http://www.getrichslowly.org/blog/2006/07/29/the-wealthy-100-a-ranking-of-the-richest-americans-past-and-present/

Sunday, February 13, 2011

Kleptocrats, Oligarchs, and Billionaire Entrepreneurs (In this Game Mubarak Is a Piker)

Kleptocrats, Oligarchs, and Billionaire Entrepreneurs (In this Game Mubarak Is a Piker)

Personal wealth is created in one of two ways. On the positive side, it arises as a result of innovation, hard work, brilliant insights, or even luck. Entrepreneurs create enormous wealth when they have a better idea (Henry Ford’s assembly line), discover and develop new products (Microsoft Windows or Google’s search engine), see a new business model (Sam Walton), or are simply at the right place at the right time. Often, it is a combination of innovation and timing, something economists call network externalities.

A second and negative route to personal wealth is through political connections, lobbying to obtain benefits from the state, violence to remove competitors, or outright theft of public resources. Those who earn their fortunes the first way create jobs, raise productivity, and contribute to economic welfare. Those who use the second route are “rent seekers” who subtract from growth and welfare for their own benefit.

Bill Gates, Sam Walton, and Sergei Brin represent wealth earned through entrepreneurship. Their Microsoft, Walmart, and Google made them not only among the richest persons in the world. They have created new technologies, hundreds of thousands of jobs, new business models, and have revolutionized they way we gather and process information. Carlos Slim, the world’s wealthiest man, made his fortune by monopolizing Mexico’s telecommunications market (presumably with help from government regulators). Poor Mexicans have been denied the wide range of choice of telephone services that others have and pay for his wealth in the form of the highest telephone rates on the continent.

The most egregious rent seeking occurs in autocratic and dictatorial regimes in which wealth accumulation is not constrained by an electorate, corporate transparency, or a free press. Such authoritarian regimes breed kleptocrats –those who accumulate wealth for themselves through their official positions. Oligarchs are those who use their access to those in power to accumulate wealth. Both kleptocrats and oligarchs transfer assets from society or from others to themselves; they do not create new products or additional jobs. They reduce economic welfare by crowding out real entrepreneurs, who refrain from economic activity knowing the fruits of their labor will be stolen. Kleptocracy and oligarchy are determined by the quality of society’s institutions and rule of law. The better the institutions, the more limited kleptocracy and oligarchy.

I present here some data on the world’s kleptocrats, oligarchs, and top entrepreneurs. The wealth of kleptocrats cannot be measured with any degree of precision because, as heads of state or government officials, they wish to conceal it. However, the figures capture rough orders of magnitude. Oligarchs, not being government heads or officials, are less prone to conceal their wealth. They may even feel a sense of pride when they see their names listed in Forbes.

I begin with a ranking of kleptocrat heads of state by absolute wealth. (I convert the wealth of past kleptocrats into current dollars). Four of the top six rule (or ruled) countries with rich natural resources (Putin, Nazarbaev, Aliev, Mobutu), such as energy or diamonds. The real “oil curse” is therefore the tendency of the rulers of mineral-rich countries to steal the national wealth. Other kleptocrats controlled poor countries lacking access to rich natural resources. The recently deposed Mubarak (whose personal wealth is listed at the maximum estimate) is in the middle range of notable kleptocrats. Of the eleven countries represented, four (Philippines, Indonesia, Nicaragua, and Peru) have subsequently democratized, although Nicaragua’s democracy may be shaky. Democracy strikes at the root causes of kleptocracy by making the rulers accountable to an electorate and investigative journalists.

Ruler(ranked top to bottom)Year  Wealth (bl. 2010 $)
Putin (Russia)2011  40
Suharto (Indonesia)1998   25
Nazarbaev Kazakhstan)2011  20
Marcos (Philippines)1986  7.5
Aliev (Azerbaijan)2011  10
Mobutu (Congo, Zaire)1997  5
Mubarak (Egypt)2011  5
Abacha (Nigeria)1998  3.5
Milosevich (Serbia)2000  1
Duvalier (Haiti)1986  0.55
Fujimori (Peru)2000  0.6
Alemain (Nicaragua)2002  0.1
Estrada (Philippines)2001  0.08

Heads of state who steal from less populous countries (Serbia, Haiti, and Nicaragua) accumulate less wealth ceteris paribus than those in populous economies (Russia, Indonesia and Nigeria). The grazing ground for kleptocrats is less spacious in poor countries than in rich countries. The percentage of the kleptocrat’s wealth to GDP is a measure of the kleptocrat-head-of-state’s s burden on society. This table shows that Mobutu, at the end of his reign in Congo, had accumulated wealth equal to more than forty percent of the nation’s meager output. Duvalier had accumulated an estimated ten percent – a figure comparable to the Central Asian oil magnates of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Marcos and Suharto are in the three to four percent range, whereas Putin and Milosevic are in the one to two percent range.

Ranked top to bottomYear  Percent of GDP
Mobutu (Congo, Zaire)1997  0.4202
Aliev (Azerbaijan)2011  0.1111
Nazarbaev (Kazakhstan)2011  0.1036
Duvalier (Haiti)1986  0.1000
Marcos (Philippines)1986  0.0429
Suharto (Indonesia)1998  0.0331
Putin (Russia)2011  0.0180
Milosevich (Serbia)2000  0.0165
Abacha (Nigeria)1998  0.0127
Mubarak (Egypt)2011  0.0100
Alemain (Nicaragua)2002   0.0073
Fujimori (Peru)2000  0.0029
Estrada (Philippines)2001  0.0003

It should be noted that these figures show the economic burden imposed only by the head of state. Heads of state have their courts, which share in the plunder of resources. The court’s assets are not calculable, but we imagine that, if they could be included as well, the kleptocratic burden would be multiplied many times over.

The next table shows the cumulated wealth of the ten wealthiest persons in industrialized democracies (the United States, the European Union, and South Korea), in two former Soviet states (Russia and Ukraine), Mexico and in China. These figures omit the wealth of the head of state.

The table shows that the top ten have more wealth in the large and wealthy United States and European Union (between 170 and 270 billion). Relatively poor Mexico and Russia both have nearly one hundred billion. (There are as many billionaires listed for “poor” Russia as for the “rich” United States – a remarkable testimony to rent seeking in Putin’s Russia.) The top ten in South Korea and Ukraine have the same amount of wealth even though South Korea is five times richer. China lies between Mexico and Ukraine although it has the world’s second largest economy.

Ranked top to bottom  Wealth of Top 10 (bln $)
US  264.8
EU (without UK)  171.5
Russia  97.0
Mexico  90.3
China  42.3
South Korea  21.4
Ukraine  17.7

The US top 10 list is comprised largely of entrepreneurs whose ideas and business methods changed whole industries (Gates, Buffet, Walton, and Brin). The Russian top 10 list is made up of Kremlin-favored oligarchs who were awarded extremely valuable assets that had previously belonged to the state. The South Korean list is populated by industrialists who formed conglomerate businesses that compete in world markets, while the Ukrainian list is made up of those who received valuable state assets during privatization. China’s list is of industrialist owners of successful Chinese companies (most partially owned with the state), who could not have been successful without the support of the Chinese state.

The next table shows the wealth of the top ten as a percent of GDP. In those countries (US, EU, South Korea) where the top wealth holders play primarily entrepreneurial roles, their share is between one and two percent. Viewed in the light of their contribution to the economy, their wealth reward seems rather modest. In Ukraine and Russia, the share of GDP of the top ten is between four and six percent – a rather substantial return to those making a negative or questionable contributions to output and welfare. The high Mexican share is due to the “Carlos Slim Effect.” He alone accounts for most of the high Mexican figure.

Top 10 Persons  Wealth of top 10 as percent of GDP
Ukraine  0.0586
Mexico  0.0583
Russia  0.0437
US  0.0184
South Korea  0.0147
EU (without UK)  0.0113
China  0.0042

China is an outlier. The wealth of its richest persons is small relative to the size of the Chinese economy. What this suggests is that there are forces at play, other than the usual constraints imposed by democracy and a free press, that have limited rapacious rent seeking on the part of connected Chinese businessmen . At this juncture, we do not know enough about the internal workings of large Chinese businesses to define the entrepreneurial roles played by their chief executives. These constraints on rent seeking in China may be one of the many (still unexplored) reasons for China’s rapid growth.

The basic message of this analysis is that, in countries with good institutions, generous wealth accumulation is a reward for positive contributions to the economy. These are rewards for innovation, radically new ideas, persistence, and risk taking. In societies with good institutions, the rewards are relatively modest as a percent of total economic activity. These rewards are constrained by competition, social morays, and the rule of law. In countries with poor institution, wealth is accumulated either by the head of state or by oligarch cronies by transferring assets from others or from society itself. Such transfers not only do not increase national wealth; they reduce it insofar as real entrepreneurs cannot prosper in such an environment.

We are often reminded of the greed of those at the top. Little attention is devoted to the contributions of those entrepreneurs whose ideas and methods have contributed to economic growth. Walmart, Microsoft and Google currently employ 2.1 million, 93,000, and 22,000 respectively. The indirect employment they create through suppliers, vendors and other stakeholders is a multiple of these figures. Their annual payrolls equal a large fraction of the accumulated wealth of their founders.

Warnings about the growing concentration of wealth at the very top must be considered in proportion to the size of economic activity, whose increase is in fact positively affected by those at the top. Today, the top ten account for less than two percent of GDP in the United States. At the turn of the twentieth century, the top ten accounted for more than five percent! In a ranking of the 100 top wealth holders from the founding of the United States to the present (as a percent of GDP), only five living persons are listed, and Gates and Buffet are ranked only numbers 31 and 39 respectively.

Data sources: This data is drawn from Forbes rankings of the world’s richest people, from estimates of Transparency International, and independent estimates of the wealth of Vladimir Putin and informal estimates of the wealth of Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan and the Aliev family of Azerbaijan. The wealth of other kleptocrats is given as of the date of their removal from power converted into 2010 US dollars. The top five Ukrainian oligarchs are taken from http://ukrainianguide.com/5-wealthiest-ukrainian-oligarchs/2/ Only five Ukrainian oligarchs made the billionaire list; so I assume there are five more slightly below one billion. Mubarak’s wealth is taken from an ABC News report of February 11, 2011 citing U.S. intelligence sources. These sources dismiss the high figures cited in the press and place Mubarak’s wealth between $1 and $5 billion. I take the upper figure to avoid underestimation. The wealthiest 100 Americans throughout history is taken from http://www.getrichslowly.org/blog/2006/07/29/the-wealthy-100-a-ranking-of-the-richest-americans-past-and-present/

Sunday, January 16, 2011

Wikileaks, Gazprom, the Putin Wealth Tax, and the Chinese Counter Example

Buried in the Wikileaks releases is an account of a rare meeting of Moscow Embassy officials in September of 2008 with the reclusive management of Russia’s largest company, Gazprom. In the meeting, the Gazprom official stated that Gazprom’s first priority is to provide reliable and affordable gas to the domestic population. The second priority is to "fulfill Gazprom’s social obligations," including charitable projects. The American envoys asked whether the maximization of shareholder value and its market share were also goals? Yes, was the perfunctory answer, but the official added a third priority: to maximize "control over global energy resources." Gazprom, the official said, is “a socialist rent-seeking monopolist."

Despite the fact the Gazprom official was speaking for the official record, his remarks are remarkably candid. Translated into clear language, he was stating that Gazprom is not run as a company that creates shareholder value for its owners (the Russian state and favored billionaire oligarchs). Its job is to exploit its monopoly position to generate “economic rents” for “society” and to act as an instrument of state power, while keeping the people happy with low gas prices and the sponsorship of sports teams.

As Soviet managers used to quip: “Under socialism, property belongs to everyone and no one. Therefore it might as well belong to me.” The veiled language of “socialist rent seeking” really means that Gazprom is to be used to make the life of the elite extremely comfortable. If it is not interested in or feels a sense of responsibility to minority shareholders, it is legitimate to ask why they should buy Gazprom stock?

“Control over global energy resources” tells us that Gazprom intends to maintain, at all costs, its monopoly over the export of natural gas from the former Soviet Union, including gas-rich Central Asia. It will use its economic power along with the diplomatic and military might of the Russian state to prevent rival pipelines from threatening its monopoly.

In order to keep the people on board with these first two goals, Gazprom must offer them cheap energy, even if that means a severe loss of potential profits. Again, the last person in line appears to be the minority shareholder.

The Russian state is the majority shareholder of Gazprom and the Russian Oil Company (Rosneft). The shares of each trade publicly. Gazprom is an almost obligatory holding for funds that invest in Russia. It accounts for more than a quarter of Russia’s meager $500 billion stock market capitalization. Other energy companies are owned by control-exercising oligarchs favored by Putin’s Kremlin. They also have minority shareholders, and their shares trade publicly.

The example of the jailed former owner of the now-defunct Yukos oil company, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, taught these “private owners” that they must also run their companies according to Gazprom’s guiding principles. Maximizing shareholder value is not among their top goals. It need not be: These private owners can benefit more from siphoning company resources into their own pockets than by creating value through efficiency gains, innovation, and investment. This is entirely rational. Who knows when they will find themselves on the wrong side of the Kremlin.

Putin’s intentions for Russian energy concerns did not become clear until 2007. They were not clear even after the 2003 arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the destruction of his Yukos oil company (One of the few that sought to maximize shareholder value).

Between 2003 and 2007, Putin was thought to be pursuing a “liberal” policy of rationalizing Russian energy concerns, “liberalizing the energy market, and encouraging cooperation and even joint ownership with international energy giants. During this spurt of optimism, Putin even spoke of making Gazprom the world’s most valuable company – even worth more than ExxonMobil – with a target market capitalization of over one trillion dollars. International investors responded to such talk by driving up Gazprom’s shares, and in the second half of 2006 Gazprom’s market capitalization briefly ranked it as the third most valuable company in the world (but still a hundred billion behind ExxonMobil).

Investor optimism was spurred by the fact that Gazprom had the world’s largest reserves with huge likely but unproven reserves. It should be remembered that the share prices of Gazprom and other publicly traded energy companies are determined in stock markets by international investors. These prices reflect the stream of future profits and dividends anticipated by investors.

Gazprom’s share price plummeted as investors began to understand Putin’s real intention. Russia’s energy reserves were to be strictly off limits to outsiders, Russian energy companies were to be run in the interests of the Russian state by its favored elite. There would be little difference between private and public management. Putin’s deputy was to run Gazprom; trusted Oligarch Vagit Alekperov could run Lukoil. Putin’s blatant and unapologetic use of tax authorities, environmental agencies, and the prosecutor’s office to threaten and blackmail foreign energy concerns could not go unnoticed even by the most bullish investors.

Putin’s energy policies enriched the favored elite, including Putin himself, and they have transformed both public and private Russian energy companies into instruments of state power. They have prevented new technology and investment from entering the industry, and output is stagnant or declining. These policies have had remarkable economic effects in the form of lost wealth and, more importantly, missed investment opportunities.

There is a consensus that Russia’s energy sector has a creaking infrastructure and that its remote and inaccessible reserves require huge capital investments. Russian energy companies lack the will and capital to make these huge investments. High share prices mean that Russian companies could tap international capital markets to obtain “cheap” capital. If Gazprom’s share price is $60 dollars, it can raise $60 million dollars by issuing a million shares. If the share price is $20, it can raise only $20 million by issuing the same number of shares.

It is relatively straightforward to calculate the wealth destruction and lost investment opportunities of Putin’s energy policies. Currently, the market value of Russia’s six largest energy concerns is some $317 billion. They constitute almost 65 percent of the market capitalization of publicly traded companies in Russia. Proven reserves are a major determinant of share values, and currently Russian energy company shares are valued between $1 and $4.50 per barrel of reserves, with Gazprom having the highest current valuation (and the small Tatneft having the lowest). At the peak of optimism concerning Putin’s energy policy in May of 2006, Gazprom traded at $10.40 per barrel of reserves, remarkably close to the world’s foremost run state-owned oil company (Statoil of Norway).

Simple calculations show that if Russian reserves were valued today at these rates of peak optimism, the market value of the top five Russian energy companies would almost triple from $317 to $1.1 trillion – an $814 billion increase that is 1.5 times the current market capitalization of the entire Russian stock market. Gazprom’s market cap alone would rise by 175 billion. This $814 billion destruction of wealth is a massive “Putin Tax” levied as a consequence of inefficiency, corruption, and political objectives. The $814 billion figure also represents the huge investment opportunities that well managed companies and a proper investment climate could yield.

It should be a major embarrassment to Putin that an energy company with much more modest reserves located in China is closer to fulfilling his goal of making Gazprom the most valuable company in the world. In September 2010, Petrochina ($329 billion) briefly surpassed ExxonMobil ($316 billion) as the company with the highest market capitalization in the world. Although Petrochina has only three quarters of Gazprom’s reserves, it is more than twice as valuable (at times three times as valuable) and its reserves are valued as highly as those of Statoil. If Putin’s energy industry had matched the achievements of Petrochina, its value would be $211 billion higher than it is today.

The valuation of Petrochina’s reserves as highly as Statoil’s may suggest an overvaluation, but it does show the huge chasm between investor sentiment concerning China’s versus Russia’s investment climate.

Again, Russia is the loser and China is the winner, although property rights are far from perfect in China, and China is embarking on its own “national champions” program. The world investment community looks at Petrochina and Gazprom through quite different lenses. These lenses say that Russian energy concerns are going nowhere but down, that property rights are insecure, that corruption is rampant, that assets are being diverted to private hands. In this regard, international investors appear to have an accurate picture of Russian reality.