Showing posts with label rule of law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label rule of law. Show all posts

Saturday, February 22, 2014

Despite Western Insistence, Ukraine Demonstrators Can Accept Nothing Less Than Yanukovich's Removal

Western media outlets give the impression that the astute diplomacy of Europe saved the day, if that is indeed the case. Wrong. The bravery, heroism, discipline, and national pride of the Ukrainian people defeated an entrenched, corrupt post-Soviet autocracy as they camped out in sub zero weather, endured beatings by riot police, and braved sniper fire that killed more than fifty of their fellows. The Yanukovich regime, egged on by Putin’s demands for a brutal crackdown, underestimated the tenacity of their opponents. They did not anticipate the outrage of all Ukraine, even in Yanukovich’s eastern regions, at the specter of deliberate sniper fire and bodies with bullets to the head in makeshift morgues in nearby hotel lobbies and churches.

go to forbes.com

Sunday, January 16, 2011

Wikileaks, Gazprom, the Putin Wealth Tax, and the Chinese Counter Example

Buried in the Wikileaks releases is an account of a rare meeting of Moscow Embassy officials in September of 2008 with the reclusive management of Russia’s largest company, Gazprom. In the meeting, the Gazprom official stated that Gazprom’s first priority is to provide reliable and affordable gas to the domestic population. The second priority is to "fulfill Gazprom’s social obligations," including charitable projects. The American envoys asked whether the maximization of shareholder value and its market share were also goals? Yes, was the perfunctory answer, but the official added a third priority: to maximize "control over global energy resources." Gazprom, the official said, is “a socialist rent-seeking monopolist."

Despite the fact the Gazprom official was speaking for the official record, his remarks are remarkably candid. Translated into clear language, he was stating that Gazprom is not run as a company that creates shareholder value for its owners (the Russian state and favored billionaire oligarchs). Its job is to exploit its monopoly position to generate “economic rents” for “society” and to act as an instrument of state power, while keeping the people happy with low gas prices and the sponsorship of sports teams.

As Soviet managers used to quip: “Under socialism, property belongs to everyone and no one. Therefore it might as well belong to me.” The veiled language of “socialist rent seeking” really means that Gazprom is to be used to make the life of the elite extremely comfortable. If it is not interested in or feels a sense of responsibility to minority shareholders, it is legitimate to ask why they should buy Gazprom stock?

“Control over global energy resources” tells us that Gazprom intends to maintain, at all costs, its monopoly over the export of natural gas from the former Soviet Union, including gas-rich Central Asia. It will use its economic power along with the diplomatic and military might of the Russian state to prevent rival pipelines from threatening its monopoly.

In order to keep the people on board with these first two goals, Gazprom must offer them cheap energy, even if that means a severe loss of potential profits. Again, the last person in line appears to be the minority shareholder.

The Russian state is the majority shareholder of Gazprom and the Russian Oil Company (Rosneft). The shares of each trade publicly. Gazprom is an almost obligatory holding for funds that invest in Russia. It accounts for more than a quarter of Russia’s meager $500 billion stock market capitalization. Other energy companies are owned by control-exercising oligarchs favored by Putin’s Kremlin. They also have minority shareholders, and their shares trade publicly.

The example of the jailed former owner of the now-defunct Yukos oil company, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, taught these “private owners” that they must also run their companies according to Gazprom’s guiding principles. Maximizing shareholder value is not among their top goals. It need not be: These private owners can benefit more from siphoning company resources into their own pockets than by creating value through efficiency gains, innovation, and investment. This is entirely rational. Who knows when they will find themselves on the wrong side of the Kremlin.

Putin’s intentions for Russian energy concerns did not become clear until 2007. They were not clear even after the 2003 arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the destruction of his Yukos oil company (One of the few that sought to maximize shareholder value).

Between 2003 and 2007, Putin was thought to be pursuing a “liberal” policy of rationalizing Russian energy concerns, “liberalizing the energy market, and encouraging cooperation and even joint ownership with international energy giants. During this spurt of optimism, Putin even spoke of making Gazprom the world’s most valuable company – even worth more than ExxonMobil – with a target market capitalization of over one trillion dollars. International investors responded to such talk by driving up Gazprom’s shares, and in the second half of 2006 Gazprom’s market capitalization briefly ranked it as the third most valuable company in the world (but still a hundred billion behind ExxonMobil).

Investor optimism was spurred by the fact that Gazprom had the world’s largest reserves with huge likely but unproven reserves. It should be remembered that the share prices of Gazprom and other publicly traded energy companies are determined in stock markets by international investors. These prices reflect the stream of future profits and dividends anticipated by investors.

Gazprom’s share price plummeted as investors began to understand Putin’s real intention. Russia’s energy reserves were to be strictly off limits to outsiders, Russian energy companies were to be run in the interests of the Russian state by its favored elite. There would be little difference between private and public management. Putin’s deputy was to run Gazprom; trusted Oligarch Vagit Alekperov could run Lukoil. Putin’s blatant and unapologetic use of tax authorities, environmental agencies, and the prosecutor’s office to threaten and blackmail foreign energy concerns could not go unnoticed even by the most bullish investors.

Putin’s energy policies enriched the favored elite, including Putin himself, and they have transformed both public and private Russian energy companies into instruments of state power. They have prevented new technology and investment from entering the industry, and output is stagnant or declining. These policies have had remarkable economic effects in the form of lost wealth and, more importantly, missed investment opportunities.

There is a consensus that Russia’s energy sector has a creaking infrastructure and that its remote and inaccessible reserves require huge capital investments. Russian energy companies lack the will and capital to make these huge investments. High share prices mean that Russian companies could tap international capital markets to obtain “cheap” capital. If Gazprom’s share price is $60 dollars, it can raise $60 million dollars by issuing a million shares. If the share price is $20, it can raise only $20 million by issuing the same number of shares.

It is relatively straightforward to calculate the wealth destruction and lost investment opportunities of Putin’s energy policies. Currently, the market value of Russia’s six largest energy concerns is some $317 billion. They constitute almost 65 percent of the market capitalization of publicly traded companies in Russia. Proven reserves are a major determinant of share values, and currently Russian energy company shares are valued between $1 and $4.50 per barrel of reserves, with Gazprom having the highest current valuation (and the small Tatneft having the lowest). At the peak of optimism concerning Putin’s energy policy in May of 2006, Gazprom traded at $10.40 per barrel of reserves, remarkably close to the world’s foremost run state-owned oil company (Statoil of Norway).

Simple calculations show that if Russian reserves were valued today at these rates of peak optimism, the market value of the top five Russian energy companies would almost triple from $317 to $1.1 trillion – an $814 billion increase that is 1.5 times the current market capitalization of the entire Russian stock market. Gazprom’s market cap alone would rise by 175 billion. This $814 billion destruction of wealth is a massive “Putin Tax” levied as a consequence of inefficiency, corruption, and political objectives. The $814 billion figure also represents the huge investment opportunities that well managed companies and a proper investment climate could yield.

It should be a major embarrassment to Putin that an energy company with much more modest reserves located in China is closer to fulfilling his goal of making Gazprom the most valuable company in the world. In September 2010, Petrochina ($329 billion) briefly surpassed ExxonMobil ($316 billion) as the company with the highest market capitalization in the world. Although Petrochina has only three quarters of Gazprom’s reserves, it is more than twice as valuable (at times three times as valuable) and its reserves are valued as highly as those of Statoil. If Putin’s energy industry had matched the achievements of Petrochina, its value would be $211 billion higher than it is today.

The valuation of Petrochina’s reserves as highly as Statoil’s may suggest an overvaluation, but it does show the huge chasm between investor sentiment concerning China’s versus Russia’s investment climate.

Again, Russia is the loser and China is the winner, although property rights are far from perfect in China, and China is embarking on its own “national champions” program. The world investment community looks at Petrochina and Gazprom through quite different lenses. These lenses say that Russian energy concerns are going nowhere but down, that property rights are insecure, that corruption is rampant, that assets are being diverted to private hands. In this regard, international investors appear to have an accurate picture of Russian reality.

BP, Putin, and Russian Oil: Will They Never Learn?

Robert Dudley, CEO of British Petroleum, and Igor Sechin, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and board chairman of Rosneft, announced a new mega-deal between BP and the state owned Russian oil company. Through a stock swap, BP acquires 10 percent of Rosneft in exchange for giving Rosneft 5 percent of BP. Together, the two companies will explore offshore tracts in Russia’s South Kara Sea. As a ten percent owner of Rosneft, BP, in theory, acquires over two billion barrels of oil reserves – enough to replace the reserves BP sold to help pay for its Gulf oil spill. The deal makes the Russian “national champion” oil company BP’s largest single shareholder. BP becomes one of Rosneft’s largest private shareholders (the state owns three quarters) along with Oligarchs Roman Abramovich and Oleg Deripaska. Deripaska, a survivor of Russian gang warfare over aluminum and nickel, has been banned from travel to the US due to his suspected ties with organized crime – an unlikely partner for the staid British company.

The BP-Rosneft deal reminds me of the Charlie Brown cartoon in which Lucy pulls the football away from Charlie Brown for the umpteenth time as he approaches to kick after solemnly promising that she will never do this again. Is this not the same Robert Dudley, the CEO of the TNK venture with Russian oligarchs, who was expelled from the country, was accused of violating Russian laws, whose employees were charged with espionage, and who saw a Russian oligarch appointed to his position – while Vladimir Putin looked on from the sidelines?

One news account of the deal points out understatedly that BP was able to acquire its ten percent share in Rosneft so cheaply due to the “political risk of investing in Russia,” reminding readers that Dudley himself had been expelled from Russia, that Shell was forced to cede its majority stake in its Sakhalin project, and that other foreign investors had been harassed out of Russia by the tax police or by threats from the prosecutor’s office.

What assurances does BP have that Russia will not again use its time-tested Lucy-Pulling-Away-the-Football trick? The BP announcement stresses that the deal was approved by Vladimir Putin himself. And none other than his trusted deputy, Igor Sechin (also board chairman of Rosneft), signed off. What greater guarantees could there be?

In Putin’s Russia, it makes little difference who signs and who approves! In the absence of a rule of law, a contract is what those in power say it is. Moreover, deals can always be scuttled in ways that leave those at the top who signed off blameless. Shell, which had a legal contract to produce in Sakhalin without a local partner, was deemed in violation of environmental regulations and was under immediate threat of losing its drilling rights. These same serious environmental violations disappeared overnight when Shell ceded majority interest in the project to Gazprom. Poor Putin, of course, was helpless. He could, not interfere in the legitimate work of his environmental protection agency. Similarly, Russian regulators used technicalities to abrogate ExxonMobil’s contractual right to market gas from its Sakhalin project outside of Gazprom’s export monopoly – another agreement approved at the highest levels of the Russian government.

The West has lectured Russia since 1991 on the importance of the rule of law. Actions, such as BP’s, tend to render these lectures hot air. No matter how badly Western energy concerns are treated, they (like the hapless Charlie Brown) will take another kick at the disappearing football.

Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Khodorkovsky Verdict Delayed

Former Yukos Chairman, Mikhail Khodorkovsky's verdict in his second Moscow trial was supposed to be delivered today, December 15. Without warning or notice, the court announced that the reading of the verdict has been delayed until December 26. The reason for the delay is obvious: Western newsmen leave Moscow between Christmas and New Year. Few will be in the Moscow court room to hear the predictable guilty verdict and the new prison sentence.

The Kremlin wants as little attention as possible. The Khodorkovsky case is becoming uncomfortable. There is widespread recognition that the charges are a sham and that Khodorkovsky is being kept in jail for political reasons. As a prisoner of conscience and a well known figure, a free Khodorkovsky could be a serious challenger to the Kremlin. The Kremlin needs to keep the verdict as quiet as possible because it is now attracting attention from civil rights advocates in Europe, who increasingly assign political dissident status to Khodorkovsky.

The Khodorkovsky case also exposes as false President Medvedev's so-called campaign to establish a rule of law in Russia. How can there be talk of rule of law when the most prominent rule-of-law case is the sham Khodorkovsky trial?