If Putin can convince his people that Russian missiles did not shoot down MH17, he can even more easily convince his domestic audience that client Bashar Assad is being framed by a sinister false-flag operation mounted by the CIA, NATO, ISIS and hostile Sunnis -- all in cahoots against the innocent Syrian dictator. Putin may even be joined the the vast community of Trump haters, who are ready to believe that Trump (and Putin) are somehow behind the gassing of Syrian innocents.
Get ready for another round of crazy conspiracy theories, which serve Putin's goal of blaming powers other than Russian and Syria for the barbarism at Idlibe.
go to Forbes.com
Paul R. Gregory's writings on Russia, the world economy, and other matters that he finds of interest.
Showing posts with label Syria. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Syria. Show all posts
Thursday, April 13, 2017
Wednesday, March 16, 2016
Ten Reasons Why Putin Wins Big In Syria While The U.S. Gets Nothing
Putin’s payoff from his Syrian “peace keeping” could be enormous; namely, a breakup of NATO and the European Union and a sell out by the West of Ukraine on the grounds that it is not fulfilling the conditions of the Minsk 2 agreement (as if Russia is). If this happens, Putin has achieved his main goal–the end of Ukraine as a unitary state to demonstrate the risks of attempting to break free from Russia’s “sphere of influence.” The ultimate disgrace is that the West welcomed Putin as a partner in Syria on the basis of his promise to fight ISIS. Instead, Putin bombed the opponents of Assad, inflicting massive civilian casualties on them and contributing to the migration flow into Europe. ISIS did not seem to appear on his target list. For those who know Putin, this was no surprise.
go to Forbes.com
go to Forbes.com
Labels:
Donald Trump,
Hezbollah,
Iran,
ISIS,
migration crisis,
Obama,
Putin,
sanctions,
Syria
Monday, November 30, 2015
Kremlin Accuses Me of Lying About Syria
Sputnik
International is a news agency that is owned by the Russian government and can
be relied on to follow the Kremlin’s propaganda line. In its Forbes (that’s me) caught lying about
average Russians' support for Syrian campaign, Sputnik brands as lies my characterization (Putin's Syria
Narrative Must Win Russian Public Opinion--But It'll Be A Hard Sell) of
a Levada Center poll on Russian attitudes towards Syria.
Sputnik
complains about my “selective use” of two of three Levada Center questions on
Syria. It seems my “lie” was to not emphasize Levada’s finding on its first
question of strong Russian support for an air campaign in Syria. To quote their
complaint:
“Gregory appears to have selectively used only Levada's
figures from the second question, which asked whether Russians "support
the Federation Council's decision to allow the use of Russian troops
abroad." The wording of the question, and particularly the word 'troops',
helps explain respondents' hesitation in supporting intervention. It also helps
explain fears about involvement turning "into a 'new' Afghanistan
situation for Russia," (with 45% suggesting it is a 'possibility or a
'certainty', and 38% that it is 'unlikely' or 'impossible'), again, presumably
only if Russian ground troops were introduced.”
Sputnik must pardon my confusion. I do not see any “lie.”
They just don’t like my citation of public opinion that suggests the Russian
people question involvement in a conflict in the Middle East that reminds them
of the Afghanistan quagmire. The poll expresses the natural concern that
Russian soldiers will eventually get involved.
Reading further into the Sputnik complaint, my “lie” also
consists of not anticipating that Levada would conduct another poll after I
finished my piece: “With the Russian air campaign now entering its second
month, and Russian ground troops nowhere in sight, Levada found, in polling
conducted last week, that the
numbers of Russians who believe the Syrian campaign could turn into 'a new
Afghanistan' is steadily dropping, with
only 35% now believing that it is possible or likely, and a full 50% confident
that it will not happen.”
Excuse me Sputnik. I
would not emphasize that 35 percent of the Russian people are in disagreement
with a Kremlin policy. Under Putin, more than a third opposition is a huge
number. Who knows what the real number would if the poll were carried out under
less repressive circumstances.
So here we go again. Throughout
the Ukraine war, Putin claimed there were absolutely no regular Russian troops in the
Donbas. There were also no Russian special forces in Crimea until Putin declared there were. The Kremlin will now insist that there are no
ground troops in Syria, although they are being interviewed by foreign media and posting selfies on social media. With
no ground troops in Syria, there can be no combat deaths, the Kremlin will
insist. In fact, the first combat death in Syria has been labeled a suicide
to the dismay of his parents.
Sputnik should be circumspect in its accusations of lying. I presume it has forgotten the defense ministry’s official briefing that proved conclusively that MH17 was downed by a Ukrainian fighter – a result covered by both Sputnik and its sister organization RT.
Sputnik should be circumspect in its accusations of lying. I presume it has forgotten the defense ministry’s official briefing that proved conclusively that MH17 was downed by a Ukrainian fighter – a result covered by both Sputnik and its sister organization RT.
We owe a debt of gratitude to Sputnik. Their strong reaction to my piece tells us that the Kremlin has deep concerns about the Russian people’s support for the Syria operation – support that can turn on a dime if body bags start flooding in from Syria.
Labels:
Forbes,
Kremlin propaganda,
Levada,
Sputnik,
Syria
Tuesday, November 24, 2015
Turkey's Downing of the Russian Fighter: Expect Nuclear Saber Rattling and Threats to NATO's Existence
The world is in for a tense time of possible nuclear brinksmanship. If the United States and the other NATO countries blink, NATO is no more, and Putin has achieved his major goal. We must worry whether the Western world is led by leaders up to the task. There should be some sleepless nights in Berlin, London, Paris and Washington D.C. Putin is rightly described as a bully—and the standard procedure against bullies is to fight back. Turkey’s Erdogan has done just that. Will Turkey’s military allies back him up or cave once more? This test, if it comes, will have profound consequences.
go to Forbes.com
Tuesday, November 17, 2015
Russia cooks its defense books Moscow says it spends less than it does so that NATO will cut back too.
Reports that Russia is limiting military spending to a 1 percent (nominal) increase in 2016 may be timed to deflate NATO’s initiative to raise defense spending to the target 2 percent for each member country. Russia is playing a dual role. On the one hand, it exults in its military power on prominent display in Syria. On the other, it plays the role of impoverished cousin — too poor to keep up military spending. Russia cannot have it both ways.
go to Politico.eu
go to Politico.eu
Labels:
NATO,
Putin,
Russia,
Russian defense budget,
Syria,
two percent rule
Wednesday, October 28, 2015
Putin's Syria Narrative Must Win Russian Public Opinion--But It'll Be A Hard Sell
According to Putin’s Syria narrative, Russia will triumphantly rejoin the Western world as its savior after its good deed in the Middle East is complete. Hard feelings over Crimea will be long forgotten; sanctions will disappear. The U.S. will become a second-rate power, unmasked as all talk and no action. Other countries will understand where the power lies and whom to have as a friend. The question is whether Putin will be able to convince the Russian people to bear the burden of yet another foreign adventure. His propaganda succeeded for Ukraine, but is less likely to work for far away Syria.
go to Forbes.com
go to Forbes.com
Labels:
Assad,
ISIS,
mercenaries,
propaganda,
Putin,
sanctions,
Syria
Tuesday, September 29, 2015
Putin’s new world order The Russian president, far from ostracized, is the center of global attention.
The president of Russia uses a Putin-speak in his speeches that we must parse word for word, in our own best interests. Only after translating them into normal speech do we learn what he has said and why. His speech Monday to the United Nations General Assembly made seven overlapping and interdependent points that are worth translating.
go to Politico
go to Politico
Sunday, September 27, 2015
On Syria, Putin goes for his holy grail
On Monday September 28, Russia’s president will propose to the UN General Assembly his plan for a broad coalition to defeat ISIS. His words will be backed byclear evidence of a substantial Russian military buildup in Syria, including Russian fighters entering Syrian airspace with transponders off. Whereas Russian troops and equipment were delivered to Ukraine in strict secrecy, the Kremlin seems to be purposely telegraphing its military moves in Syria to tee up Putin’s speech.
go to Politico.eu
go to Politico.eu
Labels:
MInsk 2,
Putin. UN General Assembly,
Syria,
Ukraine
Friday, September 18, 2015
Putin’s Civil War With His Ukrainian Allies: Clearing the Decks For Syria?
Note
Moskovsky Komsomolets’s remarkable
jabs, reversals, and admissions: The DNR is labeled a “self proclaimed”
republic, suggesting it has no legal status outside Ukraine .
The “those who watch television” remark belittles Russians and east Ukrainians,
who falsely believe that ethnic Russians in east Ukraine
harbor a deep hatred and fear of Ukrainians.
Why should they not? Russian television has broadcast horror stories of
rape, crucifixion, and murder by the Ukrainian neo-Nazis nonstop for more than
a year. Now “those who watch television”
are supposed to believe something else!
go to Forbes.com
Tuesday, September 17, 2013
Why Putin Cannot Afford Runoffs: Navalny and the Moscow Election
As Vladimir Putin was running circles around Barack Obama, opposition
mayoral candidate Navalny was giving Putin’s Kremlin a lessen in
American retail politics. Putin won big on Syria but lost big in the
Moscow mayor’s race, whose outcome may change Russian politics in the
long run.
In the September 8 Moscow mayoral election,
incumbent, Sergei Sobyanian, narrowly avoided a run off with 51.2
percent of the votes. Challenger, lawyer, anti-corruption blogger Alexei
Navalny, officially received 17.2 percent. The Moscow Electoral
Commission subsequently declared Sobyanian the victor. Navalny continues
to challenge the vote in the courts with truckloads of evidence of
voter fraud. Navalny has a snowball’s chance in hell of reversing the
outcome in Russia’s courts.
Wednesday, November 23, 2011
In Many Cases, There Is No Compromise
The Arab League and everyone else tell Bashar Assad to compromise with the Syrian protesters. Republicans and Democrats are urged to be “moderate.” The European Union urges Germany to put up more bailout money to save the spendthrifts of the South. Protesters tell the Egyptian military to be gone.
Compromise is not possible when there is no middle ground. It seems this truth escapes domestic and world politicians and pundits.
The majority of the citizens of Syria want Assad either dead or gone. He wants his opponents dead, in jail or thoroughly cowed. There is no middle ground. The outcome is “either or.” Either Assad is killed or flees or he kills or jails enough of his opponents to subdue them. He knows he must lose if he cedes ground.
The Democrats want a larger and more intrusive federal government. The Republicans think the federal government is already too large and powerful. The “middle ground” is nonexistent. Republicans fear that any further increase in government will lead to more increases. Democrats fear that even small reductions in the size of government will be a repudiation of the New Deal. Neither will budge in such a situation. It was foolish to expect “compromise” from the congressional deficit commission.
The thrifty Germans do not want to bail out the spendthrift Greeks, Portuguese and Italians. Germany’s southern neighbors would like to continue as is with the help of German transfers. Germany’s taxpayers will not accept further bailouts of their southern neighbors, and the Greeks, Portuguese and Italians do not intend to enact real austerity measures.
Protesters on Tahir Square tell the Egyptian military to “leave” and to give up power. The military controls much of the Egyptian economy and is not about to give up this largess. Where is the compromise on such an issue?
In democracies, we hope that elections will resolve such impasses. In authoritarian states, impasses are resolved by violence, not by diplomacy.
Labels:
Assad,
deficit commission,
Egyptian military,
EU,
Germany,
New Deal,
Syria
Thursday, April 28, 2011
It Would Be Hard for Assad to Lose
It is not easy to overthrow a dictator, especially one who is willing to do anything and everything to stay in power. Even in the internet age, the creation of a shadowy National Initiative for Change in Syria, will have little effect. If the regime is willing to shoot demonstrators, the price of demonstrations will eventually prove to be too high, and the demonstrations will stop.
Here are the ingredients for the overthrow of a totalitarian regime:
1. The regime is morally constrained and will not employ extreme force.
2. There is a well organized group of dedicated revolutionaries who are prepared to use all means necessary to gain power.
3. There is strong support from outside either in the form of overt or covert military and propaganda aid.
Two examples of success would be the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
In the Russian case, Nicolas II, was morally constrained to the extreme (He was devastated to learn that his people did not love him and abdicated). The Bolsheviks and their Social Revolutionary and Menshevik allies had been professional underground conspirators for a decade or more, and, among them, the Bolsheviks were prepared to use any means necessary, and the German military was prepared to lend a hand.
In the Iranian case, the Shah was constrained by his own conscience and by U.S. pressure. In the end, he was not willing to use the force necessary. His Islamic-fundamentalist opponents were well organized and had coalesced around a leader in exile. The world community considered the Shah a pariah. No country was willing to help him. After a show of resistance, the Shah resigned and left Iran for an uneasy exile.
None of these conditions for successful overthrow apply to Syria’s Assad regime. We have ample evidence that it is prepared to do anything and everything to stay in power and cares little about what the Western world thinks. After decades of dictatorial control, there is no organized opposition left, and the opposition that exists does not know how to use extreme force even if they could. There is little outside pressure. As a UN member in good standing among its peers, attempts by Western powers to gain a condemnation of Syria have failed and will continue to fail.
Even the New York Times (Embattled Arab Leaders Decide It’s Better to Fight Than Quit, April 28) has discovered that that those dictators who are prepared to use extreme force are the ones who survive. Those who followed the NYT’s advice to engage in meaningful reform are gone or will shortly be gone.
Here are the ingredients for the overthrow of a totalitarian regime:
1. The regime is morally constrained and will not employ extreme force.
2. There is a well organized group of dedicated revolutionaries who are prepared to use all means necessary to gain power.
3. There is strong support from outside either in the form of overt or covert military and propaganda aid.
Two examples of success would be the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
In the Russian case, Nicolas II, was morally constrained to the extreme (He was devastated to learn that his people did not love him and abdicated). The Bolsheviks and their Social Revolutionary and Menshevik allies had been professional underground conspirators for a decade or more, and, among them, the Bolsheviks were prepared to use any means necessary, and the German military was prepared to lend a hand.
In the Iranian case, the Shah was constrained by his own conscience and by U.S. pressure. In the end, he was not willing to use the force necessary. His Islamic-fundamentalist opponents were well organized and had coalesced around a leader in exile. The world community considered the Shah a pariah. No country was willing to help him. After a show of resistance, the Shah resigned and left Iran for an uneasy exile.
None of these conditions for successful overthrow apply to Syria’s Assad regime. We have ample evidence that it is prepared to do anything and everything to stay in power and cares little about what the Western world thinks. After decades of dictatorial control, there is no organized opposition left, and the opposition that exists does not know how to use extreme force even if they could. There is little outside pressure. As a UN member in good standing among its peers, attempts by Western powers to gain a condemnation of Syria have failed and will continue to fail.
Even the New York Times (Embattled Arab Leaders Decide It’s Better to Fight Than Quit, April 28) has discovered that that those dictators who are prepared to use extreme force are the ones who survive. Those who followed the NYT’s advice to engage in meaningful reform are gone or will shortly be gone.
Monday, April 25, 2011
NYT: More Nonsense on Bashar Assad
In today’s “Clock Ticking Against Assad,” another NYT analyst equates “studied abroad, elegant British-born wife, French speaking, and widely-read” with a desire “to reform the repressive police state he inherited from his father, given time and opportunity.” We are told that Bashar, unlike his stern father, “seems quiet, almost meek.”
The press’s treatment of Assad reminds me of the foolish optimism that greeted the appointment of the “sophisticated” Yury Andropov. (Andropov must be a reformer; he loves jazz, cognac and speaks foreign languages. Bashar must be a reformer he studied medicine in Britain).
Apparently Assad’s brutal crackdown of his own people has dashed our expectations. The Obama administration’s bet that Assad, the closet reformer, will democratize and broker a real peace with Israel appears to be lost. But, we learn from the article that this is not Basher’s fault. He is surrounded by sinister relatives and security forces, who stymie his benevolent impulses. His fault (according to an anonymous diplomat) is that he “doesn’t have the courage to do what he needs to do for the sake of the country.”
Somehow we are supposed to believe that one of the world’s tightest and most brutal dictatorships is made up of “good” and “bad” factions, where the bad guys do bad things behind the back of the “good” head of state. We are supposed to believe that Syrian security forces assassinated a leading Lebanese politician without Bashar knowing. Bashar must also be blissfully unaware of Syria’s support of Hezbollah mischief, or of the clandestine attempt to build nuclear weapons.
We are told that Basher’s salvation is meaningful reform. The Baath regime will survive if it allows freedom of assembly and press and opposition political parties! For Bashar’s sake, he should not read such stuff. Basher’s survival chances are near zero if he offers “meaningful reforms.” They will only show weakness and intensify the demonstrations (now without fear of being shot dead). The only “reform” the outraged Syrian population will accept is the removal of Bashar and his entire regime. Bashar Assad, like Qadaffi in Libya and the Mullahs in Iran, can only survive by the sword. That is their best chance, and they are likely to win.
Our diplomats and journalists must learn that dictatorships operate according to specific dynamics that do not depend on the education, background, or humanistic orientation of their leaders. Stalin was extremely well read; was kind to his daughter, and made a great impression on Roosevelt. Pol Pot frequented Paris coffee houses as he wrote his dissertation at the Sorbonne. aitler had excellent table manners. Bashar speaks French and reads good books.
These things make little difference. They are a foundation of sand upon which to base foreign policy.
The press’s treatment of Assad reminds me of the foolish optimism that greeted the appointment of the “sophisticated” Yury Andropov. (Andropov must be a reformer; he loves jazz, cognac and speaks foreign languages. Bashar must be a reformer he studied medicine in Britain).
Apparently Assad’s brutal crackdown of his own people has dashed our expectations. The Obama administration’s bet that Assad, the closet reformer, will democratize and broker a real peace with Israel appears to be lost. But, we learn from the article that this is not Basher’s fault. He is surrounded by sinister relatives and security forces, who stymie his benevolent impulses. His fault (according to an anonymous diplomat) is that he “doesn’t have the courage to do what he needs to do for the sake of the country.”
Somehow we are supposed to believe that one of the world’s tightest and most brutal dictatorships is made up of “good” and “bad” factions, where the bad guys do bad things behind the back of the “good” head of state. We are supposed to believe that Syrian security forces assassinated a leading Lebanese politician without Bashar knowing. Bashar must also be blissfully unaware of Syria’s support of Hezbollah mischief, or of the clandestine attempt to build nuclear weapons.
We are told that Basher’s salvation is meaningful reform. The Baath regime will survive if it allows freedom of assembly and press and opposition political parties! For Bashar’s sake, he should not read such stuff. Basher’s survival chances are near zero if he offers “meaningful reforms.” They will only show weakness and intensify the demonstrations (now without fear of being shot dead). The only “reform” the outraged Syrian population will accept is the removal of Bashar and his entire regime. Bashar Assad, like Qadaffi in Libya and the Mullahs in Iran, can only survive by the sword. That is their best chance, and they are likely to win.
Our diplomats and journalists must learn that dictatorships operate according to specific dynamics that do not depend on the education, background, or humanistic orientation of their leaders. Stalin was extremely well read; was kind to his daughter, and made a great impression on Roosevelt. Pol Pot frequented Paris coffee houses as he wrote his dissertation at the Sorbonne. aitler had excellent table manners. Bashar speaks French and reads good books.
These things make little difference. They are a foundation of sand upon which to base foreign policy.
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